Impeachable Speech by Shaw, Katherine
Emory Law Journal 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine Shaw, Impeachable Speech, 70 Emory L. J. 1 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol70/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 





Rhetoric is both an important source of presidential power and a key tool of 
presidential governance. For at least a century, the bully pulpit has amplified 
presidential power and authority, with significant consequences for the 
separation of powers and the constitutional order more broadly.  
Although the power of presidential rhetoric is a familiar feature of the 
contemporary legal and political landscape, far less understood are the 
constraints upon presidential rhetoric that exist within our system. 
Impeachment, of course, is one of the most important constitutional constraints 
on the president. And so, in the wake of the fourth major presidential 
impeachment effort in our history, it is worth pausing to examine the 
relationship between presidential rhetoric and Congress’s power of 
impeachment.  
Although presidential rhetoric was largely sidelined in the 2019–2020 
impeachment of President Donald Trump, presidential speech actually played a 
significant role in every other major presidential impeachment effort in our 
history. Prior to President Trump, three presidents had faced serious 
impeachment threats: Andrew Johnson, in 1868; Richard Nixon, in 1974; and 
Bill Clinton, in 1998 and early 1999. In each of these episodes, the debate 
around impeachment encompassed, among other things, public presidential 
rhetoric—lies and misrepresentations; statements that took aim at Congress or 
undermined the rule of law. In the case of Andrew Johnson, presidential rhetoric 
formed the basis of one of the articles of impeachment approved by the House 
of Representatives. In the case of Richard Nixon, the first article of impeachment 
approved by the House Judiciary Committee—though never considered by the 
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full House—made extensive reference to the president’s public statements. And 
one of the possible offenses identified in Independent Counsel Ken Starr’s 
impeachment referral focused on Bill Clinton’s lies to the American people; an 
impeachment article tracking that recommendation was initially debated by the 
House Judiciary Committee, but the language regarding public speech was 
removed before the committee vote. These aspects of impeachment history have 
largely escaped scholarly notice, and they may prove instructive as both 
Congress and the public debate impeachment, as well as other possible 
constraints on presidential rhetoric and presidential power, in 2020 and beyond. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since taking office in January 2017, President Donald Trump has used the 
bully pulpit in ways that break, often dramatically, from the rhetorical norms 
that preceded him.1 So it is perhaps not surprising that the President’s rhetoric 
was at the center of a number of early calls for his impeachment. One of the 
articles of impeachment introduced by Representative Al Green in December 
2017 identified President Trump’s support for “white supremacy, bigotry, 
racism, anti-Semitism, white nationalism [and] neo-Nazism,” and accused him 
of “inciting hate and hostility” by “sowing discord among the people of the 
United States, on the basis of race, national origin, religion, gender, [and] sexual 
orientation.”2 In 2019, after President Trump told George Stephanopoulos that 
if offered opposition research by Russia or China prior to the 2020 election, “I 
think I’d take it,”3 Elizabeth Warren responded by tweeting, “It’s time to 
impeach Donald Trump.”4 The President’s mid-2019 attack on four freshman 
Congresswomen, including a suggestion that they “go back . . . to the crime 
infested places from which they came” (all are women of color, all are American 
citizens, and three were born in the United States)5 resulted in a House resolution 
 
 1 For discussions of presidential speech in the judicial rather than impeachment context, see Katherine 
Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017); Katherine Shaw, 
Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1337 (2019). 
 2 Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, of High Misdemeanors, H.R. 646, 
115th Cong. § 1 (2017); see also Osita Nwanevu, The Case for Impeaching Trump for Bigotry, NEW YORKER 
(May 26, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-case-to-impeach-trump-for-bigotry. 
 3 Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Donald J. Trump, President of the United States (June 16, 
2019).  
 4 Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (June 12, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/ 
1138951312513601536. 
 5 See Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 14, 2019, 5:27 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/1150381394234941448 (“So interesting to see ‘Progressive’ Democrat 
Congresswomen, who originally came from countries whose governments are a complete and total catastrophe, 
the worst, most corrupt and inept anywhere in the world (if they even have a functioning government at all), 
now loudly......”); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 14, 2019, 5:27 AM), https://twitter. 
com/realDonaldTrump/status/1150381395078000643 (“....and viciously telling the people of the United States, 
the greatest and most powerful Nation on earth, how our government is to be run. Why don’t they go back and 
help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came. Then come back and show us 
how....”); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 14, 2019, 5:27 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/1150381396994723841 (“....it is done. These places need your help badly, you can’t 
leave fast enough. I’m sure that Nancy Pelosi would be very happy to quickly work out free travel 
arrangements!”). 
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condemning the statements,6 as well as spurring another round of calls for 
impeachment.7  
Still, despite these early congressional moves to link inflammatory 
presidential speech to impeachment, President Trump’s public rhetoric played a 
relatively minor role in the fall 2019 impeachment hearings before the House 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, and was similarly sidelined in the 
President’s January 2020 Senate impeachment trial. Those proceedings focused 
on a private phone call between President Trump and Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as President Trump’s efforts, both preceding and 
following that call, to predicate a White House meeting and military aid upon 
Ukrainian announcements of investigations into President Trump’s political 
rivals.8 Similarly, the two articles of impeachment approved by the House of 
Representatives in December 2019 focused on presidential conduct, not speech: 
the first article charged the President with abuse of power in his pressure 
campaign against Ukraine, and the second charged him with obstruction of 
Congress for his categorical defiance of impeachment-related subpoenas for 
documents and testimony.9  
Although President Trump’s rhetoric was not front and center in the 
impeachment proceedings against him, presidential speech has actually played 
a significant role in every other major presidential impeachment effort in our 
history. Three previous presidents have faced serious impeachment threats: 
Andrew Johnson, in 1868; Richard Nixon, in 1974; and Bill Clinton, in 1998 
and early 1999. In each of these efforts, the debate around impeachment 
 
 6 H.R. Res. 489, 116th Cong. (2019); Sarah Ferris, Heather Caygle & Melanie Zanona, House Condemns 
Trump’s ‘Racist’ Tweets Targeting Minority Congresswomen, POLITICO (July 16, 2019, 10:04 AM), https:// 
www.politico.com/story/2019/07/16/house-democrats-trump-resolution-1416782. 
 7 Alyssa Vaughn, Ayanna Pressley Calls Trump a “Twitter Thug” After Latest Racist Attack, BOS. MAG. 
(July 15, 2019, 11:48 AM), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2019/07/15/ayanna-pressley-trump-racist-
tweets/ (quoting Ayana Pressley (“We will not be dismissed and we will not be bullied by a Twitter thug. I will 
continue working every day in Congress to stand up to this Administration and make heard the voices of people 
in the Massachusetts’ 7th.”)); Clare Foran, Rashida Tlaib: “I’m Not Going Nowhere, Not Until I Impeach This 
President”, CNN POL. (July 22, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/politics/trump-rashida-tlaib-
squad/index.html (quoting Rashida Tlaib at the NAACP Annual Convention in Detroit (“I’m not going nowhere, 
not until I impeach this President.”)); Rachel Bade, Rep. Green Files Articles of Impeachment Against Trump 




 8 HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT 
12 (2019), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20191203_-_full_report___hpsci_impeachment_ 
inquiry.pdf. 
 9 Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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encompassed, among other things, public presidential speech—lies and 
misrepresentations; statements that took aim at Congress or undermined the rule 
of law. In the case of Andrew Johnson, presidential rhetoric formed the basis of 
one of the articles of impeachment approved by the House of Representatives. 
In the case of Richard Nixon, the first article of impeachment approved by the 
House Judiciary Committee—though never considered by the full House—
made extensive reference to the President’s public statements. And one of the 
possible offenses identified in Independent Counsel Ken Starr’s impeachment 
referral focused on President Clinton’s lies to the American people; an 
impeachment article tracking that recommendation was initially debated by the 
House Judiciary Committee, but the language regarding public speech was 
removed before the committee vote.10 Taken together, these episodes show that 
history offers considerable—though contested—support for including 
presidential rhetoric within an impeachment case against a sitting president.  
Of course, the significance of these historical episodes is subject to debate: 
reasonable minds can differ about the status as precedent of the early steps 
toward impeaching President Nixon, whose resignation foreclosed the prospect 
of further impeachment proceedings, or the House’s impeachments of Andrew 
Johnson and Bill Clinton, both of whom were acquitted by the Senate (Clinton 
by a significant margin, Johnson much more narrowly).11 But whether or not 
they constitute precedent in any formal sense, these episodes do shed at least 
some light on the ways members of Congress, actors within the executive 
branch, and the public at large conceived of the relationship between presidential 
speech and the process of impeachment at three critical moments in our history. 
A few caveats are in order before proceeding further. First, this Article is 
limited to presidential speech that is in some sense public. Although speech is a 
component of many of the categories of conduct we most associate with 
impeachment—perjury, for example, or obstruction of justice—I have not 
attempted a full consideration of the role of presidential speech in those sorts of 
impeachment charges. That is because my goal here is to connect the public 
presidency with impeachment history. The private speech of presidents, and the 
possibility that such speech might supply evidence of, or itself constitute, the 
sorts of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” the 
Constitution identifies as impeachable, are therefore outside the scope of this 
discussion.  
 
 10 See infra note 222. 
 11 CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 1–2 (2d ed. 1998). 
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I also do not consider what we might learn from preliminary or inchoate 
efforts to impeach other presidents. There have been a number of such episodes, 
including those involving Presidents Andrew Jackson,12 John Tyler,13 and 
Ronald Reagan.14 But the seriousness of the proceedings against Presidents 
Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton distinguish them from other historical episodes: all 
of the proceedings I consider posed existential threats to the presidents involved, 
and all prompted extensive discussion of the role of impeachment in our 
constitutional order in ways that other episodes, both earlier and more recent, 
did not.  
I also do not consider the role of public speech in impeachment efforts 
involving figures other than the president, although speech did play an intriguing 
role in some such episodes. Chief among them was the impeachment of Samuel 
Chase, who in 1804 became the first and only Supreme Court Justice to be 
impeached by the House, based in large part on partisan statements he made 
while riding circuit;15 he was acquitted by the Senate and went on to serve on 
 
 12 President Andrew Jackson came close to an impeachment fight when he vetoed the bill renewing the 
charter of the National Bank, Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 576 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter 
MESSAGES], and then circumvented Congress to move federal deposits to state banks. Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 205, 236 (1999) (describing “a 
nineteenth-century version of the Saturday Night Massacre” in which “Jackson had to remove two Treasury 
Secretaries before he could get his plan carried out by Roger B. Taney, the future Chief Justice and chief political 
henchman of the President”). Jacksonian Democrats’ House majority prevented any serious consideration of 
impeachment, but Senator Henry Clay later orchestrated the passage of a formal Senate censure resolution. 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 29–30 (2018). 
 13 John Tyler, who became the first vice president to ascend to the presidency when William Henry 
Harrison died 30 days after his inauguration, faced still more serious impeachment proceedings. GERHARDT, 
supra note 12, at 30. Tyler was widely reviled by both parties, and when he followed in Jackson’s footsteps with 
his aggressive use of the veto power, a special committee was created to determine whether Tyler had committed 
impeachable offenses. In 1843, Representative John Botts introduced articles of impeachment that accused Tyler 
of an “arbitrary, despotic, and corrupt abuse of the veto power.” CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 144 (1843) 
(statement of Rep. John Botts). Those articles were quickly defeated, but the committee issued a report that 
criticized Tyler for wielding his veto power as a “gross abuse of constitutional power” and for having 
“assumed . . . the whole Legislative power to himself[.]” GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 31.  
 14 In the twentieth century, Ronald Reagan faced an impeachment resolution after he invaded Grenada 
without consulting Congress, although the resolution failed quickly in the House Judiciary Committee. 
LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT 170–71 (2018). There 
were also calls for impeachment—though never any formal impeachment proceedings—over Iran-Contra. Id. at 
172–73; LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP xv (1997). 
 15 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL 
CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 115 (1992); GENE HEALEY, CATO INST., INDISPENSABLE REMEDY: 
THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION’S IMPEACHMENT POWER 20 (2019), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato. 
org/files/pubs/pdf/gene-healy-indispensable-remedy-white-paper.pdf (describing the “triggering offense” in the 
Chase impeachment as a “partisan diatribe Chase had unleashed on a Baltimore grand jury”). 
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the Court until his death in 1811.16 The role of speech in the impeachment of 
state officials is similarly beyond the scope of this piece.17 Finally, I leave for 
another day any in-depth consideration of congressional and presidential efforts 
to shape public narratives around impeachment—also a significant part of the 
story of speech and impeachment.  
I. THE PRESIDENT’S WORDS IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
I begin with a descriptive account of the role of presidential speech in the 
efforts to impeach Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton. 
Before turning to those episodes, though, this Part offers a brief overview of the 
major constitutional provisions governing impeachment, and highlights some of 
the major themes and fault lines in debates about the role of impeachment in the 
constitutional scheme.  
Briefly, the Constitution provides that “The President, Vice President and all 
Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”18 The document then divides responsibility between the two 
Houses of Congress, giving the power of impeachment to the House of 
Representatives,19 and the power to try impeachments to the Senate.20 The 
provision involving the Senate is the more detailed of the two. One clause 
instructs that when sitting “for that purpose”—that is, for the purpose of 
impeachment—the Senators “shall be on Oath or Affirmation,”21 presumably 
different from the ordinary oaths administered at the beginning of each 
 
 16 See REHNQUIST, supra note 15, at 115; see also Adam A. Perlin, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase: 
Redefining Judicial Independence, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 726, 789 (2010); Robert R. Blair & Robin D. 
Coblentz, The Impeachment Trials of Justice Samuel Chase, 27 MD. L. REV. 365, 369 (1967); Frank Thompson, 
Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges: An Historical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 107 (1970). 
For a full list of individuals who have been impeached by the House, see List of Individuals Impeached by the 
House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/ 
Impeachment-List/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). 
 17 See generally Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State 
Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 597 n.146 (2006) (collecting state 
constitutional provisions governing impeachment); Matthew L. Lifflander, The Only New York Governor Ever 
Impeached, 85 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J. 11 (2013); Cortez A.M. Ewing, Florida Reconstruction: 1. Impeachment 
of Governor Harrison Reed, 36 FLA. HIST. Q. 299 (1958); Frederic A. Ogg, Impeachment of Governor Ferguson, 
12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1918).  
 18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.  
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 21 Id. 
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congressional session.22 When it is the President of the United States who faces 
trial in the Senate, “the Chief Justice shall preside,”23 and “no Person shall be 
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.”24 The 
document also provides that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall . . . be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and 
Punishment, according to Law.”25 
The Constitution’s impeachment provisions, then, are both significant in 
number and spare in detail.26 Most significant for purposes of this Article is the 
language describing impeachable offenses: “Treason, Bribery, or Other High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”27  
What are high crimes and misdemeanors? The drafting history offers only 
limited clues. Once there was consensus at the Constitutional Convention that 
the president should be subject to impeachment,28 that the House and Senate, 
rather than the Supreme Court or a majority of state legislatures, should hold the 
power of impeachment,29 and that the consequences of impeachment should be 
limited to removal from office and disqualification from future officeholding,30 
 
 22 See U.S. CONST. art. VI § 3; Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials, S. Doc. No. 104-1, pt. IX, at 225–26 (1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/SMAN-
113/SMAN-113-pg223. As Jeffrey Tulis explains, “By taking a new oath, the Senate attempts to recompose 
itself into a new body, a jury. The Senators signify that although they are the same individuals, they will act 
differently than they ordinarily do. Collectively, they are pledging to change the culture and function of the 
Senate as a whole.” Jeffrey Tulis, Impeachment in the Constitutional Order, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRESIDENCY 230 (2009).  
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 24 Id. 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
 26 There are actually two other provisions touching impeachment: Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, which 
provides that the President “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United 
States, except in Cases of Impeachment;” and Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, which states that “[t]he Trial of 
all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury.”  
 27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 28 FRANK O. BOWMAN III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE 
AGE OF TRUMP 89 (2019) (“The primary points of contention were, first, whether a legislative power of executive 
removal trenched too far on the principle of the separation of powers, and, second, whether, given the length of 
tenure and powers of the president, impeachment was even necessary.”). 
 29 Id. at 91. 
 30 TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 14, at 11 (“[I]f the Senate convicts on articles of impeachment, it must 
remove the officials from his position of power. If it wishes, the Senate may further disqualify him from future 
office holdings. But unlike in England and France, where legislatures could impose capital punishment in cases 
of impeachment, Congress can do nothing more.”); BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 93 (“[The limited nature of] the 
impeachment remedy sometimes seems its most underappreciated feature. In the popular imagination, 
impeachment is often treated as if conviction still leads to drawing and quartering. But it just means the loss of 
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the question was whether and how to define impeachable conduct. There is 
limited recorded debate on these questions. In June of 1787, two North Carolina 
delegates initially proposed impeachment for “malpractice or neglect of duty,”31 
but by July the Committee of Detail had replaced that language with “Treason[,] 
Bribery[,] or Corruption.”32 By September the Committee of Eleven had 
removed “corruption,” leaving just “treason or bribery.”33 James Madison’s 
notes reflect that George Mason initially added “maladministration,” to follow 
“treason or bribery,” with the following speech: “Why is the provision restrained 
to treason and bribery only? Treason[,] as defined in the Constitution[,] will not 
reach many great and dangerous offences.”34 After Madison objected to 
maladministration, reasoning that “[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a 
tenure during pleasure of the Senate,” Mason removed “maladministration” and 
replaced it with “high crimes and misdemeanors.”35  
Nothing else in the drafting history discusses this consequential substitution, 
although the English antecedents of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” 
may offer some additional insights. As Raoul Berger wrote in 1973, a 
comprehensive review of English impeachments from the 14th to 19th century 
suggests that “‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ appear to be words of art 
confined to impeachments, without roots in the ordinary criminal law” and with 
“no relation to whether an indictment would lie in the particular 
circumstances.”36 Berger resists the suggestion that “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” should merely be understood as ordinary crimes “raised to the 
nth degree.”37 Rather, on his reading, the history shows that 
“[i]mpeachment . . . was conceived because the objects of impeachment, for one 
reason or another, were beyond the reach of ordinary criminal redress.”38  
 
a job.”). 
 31 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78–79 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 32 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 145. 
 33 Id. at 499. 
 34 Id. at 550. 
 35 Id. at 550–52. 
 36 RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 62 (1973). 
 37 Id. at 59.  
 38 Id. Cass Sunstein endorses this reading of the history, arguing that “the great cases involving 
impeachable conduct in England usually involved serious abuses of the authority granted by public office, or, in 
other terms, the kind of misconduct in which someone could engage only by virtue of holding such an office.” 
CASS SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZENS GUIDE 36 (2017). Josh Chafetz similarly writes that “th[e] history 
makes clear that ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ was generally understood as encompassing distinctly political 
offenses.” Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2010); see also Andrew 
Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 
2171 (2019) (describing English impeachment for an officer’s “having breached his oath of ‘due and faithful 
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Contemporaneous commentary confirms this understanding. Alexander 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 65 that impeachable offenses are “those offenses 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the 
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with 
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries 
done immediately to the society itself.”39 Several decades later, Joseph Story’s 
influential Commentaries on the Constitution described impeachable offenses as 
“political” offenses.40 And Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, 
though often critiqued for incorrectly predicting that the American constitutional 
scheme made impeachment too easy to invoke and thus susceptible to abuse, 
also identified impeachment as designed to deprive a political actor “of the 
authority he has used to amiss.”41  
The weight of recent commentary has been consistent with the basic view 
that impeachment does not require proof of a crime, but rather is designed to 
target serious abuses of authority by political actors.42 Charles Black’s classic 
treatise on impeachment focuses on the essentially political character of 
impeachable misconduct, identifying high crimes and misdemeanors as behavior 
that strikes at the fabric of the political order, rendering the president’s 
continuance in office intolerable.43 Black offers as an example a presidential 
course of action that contains elements of both speech and conduct: a 
presidential promise not to appoint anyone of a particular religion to public 
office—he uses the example of Roman Catholics—and then presidential conduct 
consistent with that promise.44 Clearly neither the promise nor the action (really 
inaction) is criminal; but, Black argues, they are inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for office, as well as its guarantees 
of religious freedom and equality.45 Though non-criminal, the conduct and 
speech are either unconstitutional or anticonstitutional.46 And, significantly, 
 
discharge and execution of [his] Duty’”).  
 39 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 40 JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 559 (5th ed. 1994). 
 41 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101 (1838); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 
14, at 13–14 (discussing de Tocqueville on impeachment).  
 42 For the opposing position, see COUNS. TO PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP & OFF. WHITE HOUSE COUNS., 
TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 1–2 (2020). See also Alan Dershowitz (@alandersh), 
TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://twitter.com/AlanDersh/status/1219727550974283776?ref_src= 
twsrc%5Etfw (claiming that “criminal like behavior akin to treason and bribery is required [for impeachment]”). 
 43 BLACK, supra note 11, at 33–37.  
 44 Id. at 31. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. (“I cannot believe that it would make any difference whether this conduct was criminal for general 
purposes; it would clearly be a gross and anticonstitutional abuse of power, going to the life of our national unity, 
and it would be absurd to think that president might not properly be removed for it.”). For a thoughtful argument 
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there is no obvious remedy other than impeachment—no criminal penalties 
could ever attach, and no president could ever be compelled to appoint any 
particular individual or class of individuals to office.47  
Although making clear that the category of impeachable offenses is not 
coterminous with criminal offenses, Black also maintains that impeachment is 
not appropriate for the offense of maladministration—that is, poor performance, 
even egregiously poor, in executing the office of president.48 According to 
Black, the remedy for maladministration is not impeachment; it is election. 
Recent books by Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz,49 as well as Cass Sunstein,50 
Michael Gerhardt,51 and Frank Bowman,52 all endorse Black’s core claims about 
the purposes of impeachment: that its goal is to target serious political 
misconduct, and that such misconduct need not be criminal.53 
Major themes, then, during the framing of the Constitution and since, have 
been the kinds of conduct that should be deemed impeachable; the relationship 
between the criminal law and “high crimes and misdemeanors;” and the point at 
which misconduct or unfitness shades into impeachability. At each of the three 
historical moments discussed in the parts that follow, the relevant players 
grappled with all of these questions, with presidential speech playing an 
important role in each episode.  
A. Andrew Johnson: “Intemperate, inflammatory and scandalous 
harangues . . . peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the chief magistrate 
of the United States” 
In 1868, Andrew Johnson became the first president in American history to 
be impeached by the House of Representatives. Johnson, who had become the 
“accidental President” when he ascended to the presidency after Lincoln’s 1865 
 
that impeachment does require some violation of law, see Nikolas Bowie, High Crimes Without Law, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 59, 76 (2018) (arguing that “to convict someone of “high Crimes” without law . . . would . . . set a 
dangerous precedent, giving congressional prosecutors and judges as much unlimited discretion as Parliament 
once had to accuse and convict a political opponent of a crime”). 
 47 BLACK, supra note 11, at 31. The House’s detailed manual on impeachment reflects the scholarly 
consensus that conduct need not be criminal to be impeachable. As the Manual explains, fewer than “one-third 
of all the articles the House has adopted have explicitly charged the violation of a criminal statute, or used the 
word ‘criminal’ or ‘crime.’” Impeachment, H.R. Doc No. Y 1.2:P 88/2/2017, at 612–13 (2017).  
 48 BLACK, supra note 11, at 27–28. 
 49 TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 14, at 40–41. 
 50 SUNSTEIN, supra note 38, at 56–57. 
 51 GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 59–60. 
 52 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 104–05. 
 53 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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assassination,54 clashed early and often with congressional Republicans. 
Johnson was a Southern Democrat who had opposed secession—the reason he 
had been selected to appear on a “National Union” ticket when Lincoln ran for 
reelection in 1864—but as President worked at every turn to thwart 
congressional efforts at a robust Reconstruction.55 Tensions between Johnson 
and congressional Republicans built throughout 1865 and 1866, and after 
Republicans dramatically increased their congressional majority during the 
November 1866 midterm elections, impeachment talk began in earnest. The first 
impeachment resolution, accusing Johnson of general corruption, unfitness for 
office, and abuse of the pardon and veto powers, was introduced in January 
1867.56 At this point there was sufficient hesitation regarding what this untested 
constitutional process actually required that initial efforts floundered.57 But after 
a December 1867 State of the Union message in which Johnson inveighed 
against Congress and alluded to having considered using force against them,58 
and following Johnson’s termination of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in 
violation of the Tenure of Office Act, a statute that purported to require the 
Senate to consent to such a move, the House moved in earnest to initiate 
impeachment proceedings.59 The House eventually approved eleven articles of 
impeachment against Johnson, nine of which focused on conduct related to the 
Tenure of Office Act.60 
But the tenth article of impeachment is the most relevant for purposes of this 
discussion. That article charged that President Johnson “did . . . make and 
deliver . . . certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous 
harangues . . . [which] are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the Chief 
 
 54 Glen Elsasser, Johnson, The Accidental President, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 19.  
 55 BRENDA WINEAPPLE, THE IMPEACHERS: THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE DREAM OF A JUST 
NATION xviii–xix, 148–52 (2019). 
 56 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 164–65. 
 57 Cynthia Nicoletti, Andrew Johnson’s Impeachment and the Pardoning Power, J. CIV. WAR ERA 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with author). 
 58 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 165; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW 
JOHNSON 75–76 (1973) (“For the first time, the President had clearly indicated that he had considered forcible 
resistance to Congress. He had decided against it not because his action would have been illegal or 
unconstitutional but because in the President’s opinion the Reconstruction Acts did not justify it.”). 
 59 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 165–66. 
 60 The first eight articles described Johnson’s violation of the Tenure of Office Act, including his removal 
of Edwin Stanton and installation of Lorenzo Thomas as Stanton’s replacement. The ninth article accused 
Johnson of directing William H. Emory, a Major General in the Army, to disregard a statute that directed orders 
to issue from the President through the General of the Army, rather than to the Major General directly. The 
Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States, U.S. SENATE, 
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Johnson.htm#7 (last visited Sept. 4, 
2020). 
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Magistrate of the United States.”61 The rhetoric cited was primarily targeted at 
Congress, and the tenth impeachment article reproduced a number of speeches 
in which Johnson hurled accusations at Congress, accusing it of “poison[ing] the 
constituents against [Johnson],” and “trying to break up the government.”62 In 
one speech he also promised the crowd, apparently in reference to his 
congressional critics: “if you will stand by me in this action, if you will stand by 
me in trying to give the people a fair chance, soldiers and citizens . . . . God be 
willing, I will kick them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I can.”63 
Shifting the focus away from the Tenure of Office Act, and toward the 
rhetoric that was the focus of the tenth impeachment article, actually mirrors a 
recent turn in both legal and historical scholarship (and historiography) of the 
Johnson impeachment. For many years, the focus on the Tenure of Office Act 
occurred in the context of a narrative in which the Radical Republicans in 
Congress—in particular Congressman Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Charles 
Sumner—overreached badly, improperly attempting to use impeachment to 
remove a president over legitimate policy disagreements, and relying upon a 
constitutionally dubious (and later repudiated)64 statute to justify their power 
grab. This conventional narrative, famously reflected in John F. Kennedy’s 
Profiles in Courage and more insidiously by Confederate-sympathizing 
expositors in the “Dunning School,”65 maintained that the House’s approval of 
impeachment articles was at best misguided, at worst a travesty, and that the 
Senate was plainly correct to acquit Johnson of the charged offenses.66  
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 54 (1926) (striking down a statute requiring the president to 
obtain Senate approval before removing a postmaster). 
 65 William A. Dunning, The Undoing of Reconstruction, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1901), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/magazine/archive/1901/10/the-undoing-of-reconstruction/429219/. See generally ERIC FONER, THE 
SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION xxi–xxii 
(discussing the Dunning School). 
 66 See JOHN F KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 115–16 (1956) (singling out Kansas Republican Senator 
Edmund Ross, who defied his party and voted to acquit Johnson, for particular praise); DAVID O. STEWART, 
IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE FIGHT FOR LINCOLN’S LEGACY 315 (2009) 
(describing the Johnson impeachment as “a political and legal train wreck”); BERGER, supra note 36, at 252 
(“Johnson’s trial serves as a frightening reminder that in the hands of a passion-driven Congress the process [of 
impeachment] may bring down the pillars of our constitutional system.”); Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton 
Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 423 (2000) (referencing 
the general view of the “clear mistake of the Johnson impeachment”); C. Vann Woodward, That Other 
Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1974, at 215 (describing impeachment as relegated to the same “abysmal 
dustbin” as “secession,” “appeasement,” and “isolationism”). Some scholars, however, resisted this narrative. 
See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 126 (“Most historians have interpreted the attempt to remove President 
Johnson as blatantly political, insupportable in law, a blunder from which the nation was saved by seven noble 
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But there has been a significant shift in recent writing on Johnson’s 
impeachment. Historian Brenda Wineapple’s 2019 history The Impeachers 
recasts the struggle between Johnson and Congress, including the impeachment 
effort, as “neither trivial nor ignominious” but “unmistakably about race,”67 and 
about the nature of the democracy that would take hold in the post-Civil War 
United States. Although Johnson had opposed secession, he was a fierce 
opponent of equality and universal suffrage. During his time in office as 
President, Johnson pardoned and then empowered Confederate officials;68 
dismissed systematic racial violence and terror in the South; vetoed the 
Freedman’s Bureau Bill, the Civil Rights Act,69 and the Reconstructions acts;70 
sought to restore the southern states to “their rightful place in a representative 
government” without suffrage for African Americans;71 and attempted to 
prevent passage and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 All of this, 
history makes clear, seems to have been animated by a desire to “keep the United 
States a white man’s country with a white man’s government.”73  
This, then, was the backdrop against which impeachment unfolded. 
Although the congressional Republicans who were the key drivers of 
impeachment focused their charges on Johnson’s violation of the Tenure of 
Office Act, the seeds of their impeachment effort trace back not just to Johnson’s 
earlier conduct vis-à-vis Reconstruction but, importantly, to his rhetoric. In 
Wineapple’s telling, although tensions had been growing throughout 1865, an 
episode in early 1866 was for some the point at which the turn toward 
impeachment came. In an extemporaneous address to a crowd that had gathered 
at the White House to celebrate George Washington’s birthday, Johnson 
“proceeded to unleash . . . a startling chain of venomous epithets and head-
turning images—about decapitation and crucifixion[.]”74 Johnson continued his 
tirade, calling the trio of Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Wendell 
Phillips traitors, claiming that “this posse of maniacs and revolutionists was 
 
Republican Senators who would not succumb to the political pressure around them . . . such a view is naive in 
the extreme.”); FONER, supra note 65, at 335 (“Nowhere were the real reasons Republicans wished to dispose of 
Johnson mentioned—his political outlook, the way he had administered the Reconstruction Acts, and his sheer 
incompetence.”).  
 67 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at xxv. 
 68 Id. at 32–33.  
 69 Id. at 112–13.  
 70 BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 22. 
 71 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 91. 
 72 Id. at xxiv; BOWMAN supra note 28, at 161 (“Johnson did not campaign openly against the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but he let his views be known. . . . When asked, he advised the Southern legislatures not to ratify 
it.”). 
 73 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 157.  
 74 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 116; see also BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 13–14. 
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conspiring to overthrow the government and book him out of his job,” and 
ended, “The blood that warms and animates my existence shall be poured out as 
the last libation as a tribute to the union to the States.”75 Following this diatribe, 
William Lloyd Garrison wrote that Johnson might be guilty of an impeachable 
offense for “attacking some of [Congress’s] most estimable and distinguished 
members as assassins who are conspiring to take his life.”76 And Senator 
William Pitt Fessenden responded, “The long agony is over . . . he has broken 
the faith, betrayed his trust, and must sink from detestation into contempt.”77 
This was a significant turning point, but it would be nearly two more years 
before serious impeachment proceedings began. In the months that followed his 
tirade, Johnson vetoed the first Civil Rights Act, which then passed over his 
veto; worked to undermine passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; and saw his 
Southern policies result in devastating massacres of African Americans in 
Memphis and then New Orleans.78 When Johnson embarked on his “swing 
around the circle,” a massively unsuccessful attempt to build political support in 
advance of the 1866 midterm elections,79 he was met with criticism for these and 
other matters; he responded in the same register as his Washington’s birthday 
address, giving speeches that attacked the legitimacy of Congress and his 
congressional opponents. Johnson fumed about “a body, called, or which 
assumes to be, the Congress of the United States, while in fact it is a Congress 
of only a part of the States. We have seen this Congress pretend to be for the 
Union, when its every step and act tended to perpetuate disunion[.]”80 The 
speeches again took aim at congressional critics by name; at one stop he asked 
the crowd, “Why don’t you hang Thad[deus] Stevens and Wendell Phillips?”81 
The President’s rhetoric on this tour turned public sentiment strongly against 
him. Following his stop in Chicago, the Tribune’s headline read, “The Ravings 
of a Besotted and Debauched Demagogue.”82 Not long after, a former Johnson 
supporter wrote in the New York Times, “Was there ever such a madman in so 
 
 75 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 116–17. This style of rhetoric toward his political adversaries was not 
new to Johnson; when he ran for the Tennessee legislature in 1835, he referred to his rivals as “ghouls, hyenas, 
and carrion crows.” Id. at 51–52. 
 76 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 117. 
 77 Id. 
 78 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 262–64 (1988).  
 79 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 153.  
 80 Andrew Johnson: Article X, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/historyculture/article-
x.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). 
 81 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 156.  
 82 Id. 
SHAWPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 11:50 AM 
16 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
high a place as Johnson?”83 The midterm elections that followed the tour 
represented “a disastrous defeat for the President,” with the Republicans gaining 
enough seats to comfortably override any presidential vetoes.84 They promptly 
began doing so, first with the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which divided the 
former Confederate states into military districts and set forth the terms of their 
readmission into Congress, in particular a requirement that they amend their 
state constitutions to create universal (male) suffrage and ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which Congress had passed in June of 1866.85 The new Congress 
also passed—over the President’s veto—the Tenure of Office Act, which 
required the President to obtain the consent of the Senate before firing a Cabinet 
official (and identified violation of the statute as a “high misdemeanor”).86 
Early 1867 also saw the formal initiation of impeachment-related 
proceedings, although this first effort would be short-lived. In January, 
Representative James Mitchell Ashley gave a speech on the House floor that 
began, “I do impeach Andrew Johnson, Vice President and sitting President of 
the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.”87 He offered a fairly 
general list that included “usurpation of power and violation of law.”88 The 
House authorized the Judiciary Committee to open an impeachment inquiry, but 
the full House voted against impeachment by the end of 1867.89 Just days earlier, 
Johnson had delivered to Congress a message that was shocking in its vitriol and 
racism, and that alluded to the use of force against Congress.90 This moved some 
 
 83 Id. at 157. 
 84 FONER, supra note 78, at 267. 
 85 Id. at 276–77. 
 86 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 185; Tenure of Office Act, ch. 153 Stat. at Large 430, § 1 (providing that 
“the Secretar[y] of War . . . , shall hold [his] office[] . . . subject to removal by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate”); id. at § 6 (“That every removal, appointment, or employment made, had, or exercised, contrary 
to the provisions of this act . . . shall be deemed, and are hereby judged to be, high misdemeanors[.]”). 
 87 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 175.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. at 231. For a much more detailed account of this early impeachment effort, see Nicoletti, supra note 
57. 
 90 “How far the duty of the President ‘to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution’ requires him to 
go in opposing an unconstitutional act of Congress is a very serious and important question, . . . cases may occur 
in which the Executive would be compelled to stand on its rights, and maintain them regardless of all 
consequences. If Congress should pass an act which is not only in palpable conflict with the Constitution, but 
will certainly, if carried out, produce immediate and irreparable injury to the organic structure of the 
Government, and if there be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it inflicts nor power in the people to protect 
themselves without the official aid of their elected defender . . . in such a case the President must take the high 
responsibilities of his office and save the life of the nation at all hazards.” 6 MESSAGES, supra note 12, at Third 
Annual Message, December 3, 1867 (emphasis added). In addition, the speech was rife with rank white 
supremacy; historian Eric Foner describes the speech as “probably the most blatantly racist pronouncement ever 
to appear in an official state paper of an American President.” FONER, supra note 78, at 180. 
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additional Republicans in the direction of impeachment,91 though not enough; 
but the events that would form the crux of the next impeachment case were 
already in motion. In August of 1867, Johnson moved to suspend Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton, after Stanton had refused Johnson’s request that he resign 
(relations between Stanton, who had been Lincoln’s War Secretary, and Johnson 
had been strained since early in Johnson’s term as President, but it was Stanton’s 
dutiful execution of Congress’s Military Reconstruction Acts, with which 
Johnson violently disagreed, that impelled Johnson to finally move against 
Stanton).92 In January of 1868, the Senate refused to acquiesce in Stanton’s 
removal, and in February of 1868, Johnson fired Stanton without the Senate’s 
consent in violation of the Tenure of Office Act.93 Johnson then attempted to 
install the manifestly unqualified desk officer Lorenzo Thomas in Stanton’s 
place.94 Stanton refused to vacate the office, and his standoff with Thomas was 
memorialized in several articles of impeachment.95 The Senate quickly 
convened in executive session, and the next day Thomas was arrested for 
violating the Tenure of Office Act.96 That very day the House Committee on 
Reconstruction recommended impeachment.97 Although there was still some 
trepidation about the wisdom of this course, Johnson’s firing of Stanton seemed 
to crystallize for many that “Reconstruction was at stake. The law was at 
stake.”98 
Representative John Bingham began the debate on the House floor the next 
day, rising to pronounce, “I stand here . . . filled with a conviction as strong as 
knowledge that the President of the United States has deliberately, defiantly, and 
criminally violated the Constitution, his oath of office, and the laws of the 
 
 91 BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 76–77 (“The presidential message reinforced the radicals’ opinion that 
removal was a necessity.”) 
 92 STEWART, supra note 66, at 93–96. 
 93 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 153 Stat. at Large 430, § 1 (providing that “the Secretar[y] of War . . . , shall 
hold [his] office[] . . . subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”); id. at § 6 (“That 
every removal, appointment, or employment made, had, or exercised, contrary to the provisions of this 
act . . . shall be deemed, and are hereby declared to be, high misdemeanors[.]”). 
 94 STEWART, supra note 66, at 132–35. 
 95 Article 4 charged that the President “did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other 
persons to the House of Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation and threats, to hinder and prevent 
Edwin M. Stanton, then and there, the Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of 
the United States, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, contrary to and in violation 
of the Constitution of the United States.” The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United 
States, U.S. SENATE, www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Johnson.htm#7 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2020). 
 96 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 251. 
 97 Id. at 254. 
 98 Id. at 259. 
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country.”99 Debate proceeded, with some members focused narrowly on the 
Tenure of Office Act, and others condemning Johnson in much more sweeping 
terms, sometimes invoking the role of rhetoric in Johnson’s misconduct. Sydney 
Clarke of Kansas pronounced that “Andrew Johnson is . . . guilty as inciter and 
provoker of the nameless crimes which have been inflicted upon the freedmen 
in the South; the two thousand murders known to have been committed in the 
state of Texas alone; and of the thousands of similar atrocities[.]”100 Johnson’s 
defenders responded to the crux of the case against him, that he had violated of 
the Tenure of Office Act, by maintaining that he had only been testing a 
constitutionally dubious statute, and that in any event it wasn’t clear the statute 
applied to Stanton at all.101 
After a single day of debate, the House voted in favor of the impeachment 
resolution, 126 to 47, and the Speaker of the House then appointed a group to 
identify the specific impeachment charges.102 As they set to work, the majority 
of the articles they drafted focused on the Tenure of Office Act. But Thaddeus 
Stevens “didn’t want impeachment defined in such crabbed terms,”103 and 
Wendell Phillips concurred, explaining, “I do not care whether Johnson has 
stepped on a statute or not”; what mattered, he said, was that Johnson, “by either 
his conscience or perverseness had set himself up systematically to save the 
South from the verdict of the war, and the necessity of the epoch in which we 
now live.”104 In furtherance of this vision, Stevens, together with ally Ben Butler, 
composed the tenth and eleventh articles of impeachment, which swept far more 
broadly than the others.105 
The tenth article most clearly identified the kind of conduct that for many 
actually underlay the impeachment effort; it also focused almost exclusively on 
the President’s speech. That article charged the following: 
 
 99 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1340 (1868). 
 100 Id. at 1390. 
 101 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 290 (1868) (Frederick Stone, of Maryland, arguing that 
the Tenure of Office Act is “as clearly unconstitutional as any act ever passed,” and that “the President, if he 
believes any part of the Constitution is infringed or broken, must take the means the Constitution gives him to 
repair it”); see also Aditya Bamzai, Tenure of Office and the Treasury: The Constitution and Control over 
National Financial Policy, 1787 to 1867, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 181 n.527 (2019) (“[T]here was a strong 
argument that Johnson had not violated the text of the statute, which appeared not to apply to holdovers from 
the Lincoln Administration.”). 
 102 STEWART, supra note 66, at 149. 
 103 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 265. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful 
of the high duties of his office and the dignity and proprieties thereof, 
and of the harmony and courtesies which ought to exist and be 
maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the 
government of the United States, designing and intending to set aside 
the rightful authority and powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into 
disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt and reproach the Congress of the 
United States, and the several branches thereof, to impair and destroy 
the regard and respect of all the good people of the United States for 
the Congress and legislative power thereof (which all officers of the 
government ought inviolably to preserve and maintain,) and to excite 
the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States 
against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted; 
and in pursuance of his said design and intent, openly and publicly, 
and before divers assemblages of the citizens of the United States 
convened in divers parts thereof to meet and receive said Andrew 
Johnson as the Chief Magistrate of the United States, did, . . . make 
and deliver with a loud voice certain intemperate, inflammatory[,] and 
scandalous harangues, and did therein utter loud threats and bitter 
menaces as well against Congress as the laws of the United States duly 
enacted thereby, amid the cries[,] jeers[,] and laughter of the 
multitudes . . . Which said utterances, declarations, threats[,] and 
harangues, highly censurable in any, are peculiarly indecent and 
unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States[.]106 
The article excerpted several speeches from the “swing around the circle” and 
just before, though intriguingly, not the ones containing what were arguably the 
most outrageous statements, in particular the suggestions that violence be done 
to Johnson’s main congressional antagonists. The eleventh article, though 
concerned with the Tenure of Office Act, also focused on Johnson’s speech, 
enumerating several additional speeches in which he undermined or disparaged 
Congress and its authority.107 The eleventh article combined several distinct 
charges: that Johnson had not only violated the Tenure of Office Act, but also 
thwarted Reconstruction and disparaged Congress by charging that because it 
was composed of only a subset of the states, it lacked authority to act, including 
to amend the Constitution.108  
These articles were transmitted quickly to the Senate, which began its 
proceedings the following month. The Senate trial was presided over by Chief 
 
 106 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Supp. 1868).  
 107 The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States, U.S. SENATE, www.senate. 
gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Johnson.htm#7 (last visited Sept. 3, 2020).  
 108 Id.; STEWART, supra note 66, at 162.  
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Justice Salmon Chase, a complicated figure who harbored presidential ambitions 
of his own.109 The House’s case was prosecuted by a group of seven managers 
that included John Bingham, Ben Butler, and Thaddeus Stevens.110 Johnson’s 
formidable defense team included former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin 
Curtis (who had dissented in Dred Scott111 and departed the Court soon after),112 
former Attorney General William Evarts, prominent lawyers William Groesbeck 
and Thomas Nelson, and former Attorney General Henry Stanberry.113 
The trial proceedings, which lasted approximately five weeks, centered on 
the Tenure of Office Act, but trial witnesses also included reporters and 
stenographers who had witnessed the speeches that were the subject of the tenth 
article.114 After testimony from a number of witnesses and lengthy arguments 
from both the House managers and the President’s defense team, the voting 
began, first with the eleventh article. The vote was close and uncertain until the 
last moment; in the end, Senator Edmund Ross, who had pledged to vote for 
impeachment on the eleventh article, voted to acquit, leaving the prosecution 
one vote short of the required 2/3 (with rumors swirling both at the time and 
later that bribes or promises had influenced his vote).115 Some weeks later, votes 
were held on the second and third articles of impeachment, with those, too, 
falling one vote short of the 2/3 of Senators required to convict.116 
No vote was ever taken on the tenth article.117 But there are indications in 
written statements that several Senators harbored concerns about imposing the 
punishment of impeachment for speech, however offensive. Senator James 
 
 109 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 270–71; FONER, supra note 78, at 335. 
 110 History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, Chapter VIII, Organization of the Court Argument of 
Counsel, AVALON PROJECT (2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/john_chap_08.asp. 
 111 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 564 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 112 Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law 
of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2014 (1996). 
 113 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 276–83; BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 137. 
 114 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (Supp. 1868).  
 115 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 364, 367. Indeed, during the weeks following the vote on article 11, a 
House Committee embarked on an expedited investigation of potential bribery and improper influence, and 
amassed considerable information implicating both Ross and several other Senators. But, in Brenda Wineapple’s 
terms, “there was a great deal of smoke, . . . but no fire.” Id. at 383.  
 116 Id. at 386–87.  
 117 Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 235. After narrowly surviving impeachment, Johnson limped to the end 
of the term he had inherited, failing to win the Democratic nomination for president in 1868 (though he later did 
serve as a Senator). Although Johnson was unsuccessful in restoring the South to the place he sought for it in 
the post-war national government, his vision and legacy in fact endured in many ways. As Jeffrey Tulis and 
Nicole Mellow argue, “What [Johnson] did successfully with his preemptive efforts on behalf of the South, his 
obstructionist politics, and his dogged rhetoric was to lay the groundwork for and guide southern states toward 
ultimate victory,” which endured post-Reconstruction “for more than one hundred years at least.” JEFFREY K. 
TULIS & NICOLE MELLOW, LEGACIES OF LOSING IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100 (2018). 
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Patterson noted that “in view of the liberty of speech which our laws authorize, 
in view of the culpable license of speech which is practiced and allowed in other 
branches of the Government, I doubt if we can at present make low and 
scurrilous speeches a ground of impeachment.”118 Senator Sherman echoed this 
view; while indicating his support for conviction on a number of the other 
articles, he voiced concerns about the tenth article, arguing that “we must guard 
against making crimes out of mere political differences or the abuse of the 
freedom of speech.”119  
Despite these isolated statements, the focus of the impeachment trial 
remained squarely on the Tenure of Office Act. And in the end, it does seem 
likely that the de-emphasis of Johnson’s speech and conduct vis-à-vis Congress, 
individual members of Congress, and Reconstruction more broadly, was a 
consequential choice, one that may have had repercussions both for the outcome 
of the country’s first presidential impeachment episode, and for the thinking 
about impeachment for many years to come.  
B.  Richard Nixon: “False and misleading public statements . . . contrary to 
his trust as president and subversive of constitutional government” 
President Nixon’s 1974 resignation foreclosed the possibility of full 
impeachment proceedings and removal from office.120 But at the time of Nixon’s 
departure from office—two weeks after a unanimous Supreme Court ordered 
him to turn over audio recordings that revealed his involvement in covering up 
the Watergate break-in—the House Judiciary Committee had already approved 
three articles of impeachment against him. And a review of the record reveals 
that both the articles of impeachment, and the committee proceedings that 
surrounded them, were very much concerned with the President’s public 
statements. 
 
 118 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 509 (Supp. 1868). 
 119 Id. at 450. Senator Sherman did note that due in part to rhetoric of the sort at issue in the tenth article, 
President Johnson had “justly forfeited the confidence of the people.” Id. Congressman John Bingham’s closing 
arguments responded to these general concerns with the argument that “[t]he freedom of speech guarantied by 
the Constitution to all the people of the United States, is that freedom of speech which respects, first, the right 
of the nation itself, which respects the supremacy of the nation’s laws[.]” Id. at 402. 
 120 Most commentators take as a given that Nixon would have been removed from office had he not 
resigned when he did. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 4-16, at 218 (1978); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 1 
(1999) (“Richard Nixon would have been impeached and convicted had he not resigned after the House Judiciary 
Committee recommended his impeachment to the full House.”); Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in Time of 
Crisis, 51 HOW. L.J. 653, 671 (2008) (describing the Nixon case as “virtually guaranteeing that, if [Nixon] had 
not resigned, he would have been impeached and removed from office”). 
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The events underlying the impeachment effort and Nixon’s resignation 
primarily grew out of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s 
offices in the Watergate Hotel. On June 17, 1972, five men were arrested in the 
process of breaking into the Democrats’ offices,121 most likely to rearrange 
surveillance equipment they had previously installed.122 On June 22, President 
Nixon publicly denied any White House ties to the break-in, telling a group of 
reporters, “The White House had no involvement in this particular incident.”123 
The burglars’ connections to the President’s reelection campaign and the White 
House quickly became clear, however, and inside the White House, the President 
and his top advisors quickly began to strategize about how to prevent the FBI 
from unearthing links to both the White House and the President’s campaign 
committee.124 As the country would learn much later, the President’s Oval 
Office recording system captured the President telling Chief of Staff H.R. 
Haldeman that “[the CIA] should call the FBI in and say that . . . for the country, 
don’t go any further into this case, period.”125 
Despite active investigations—by the FBI, the Department of Justice, and 
the press—that quickly began to identify connections between the burglars and 
the White House, the President was easily reelected four months later, in 
November 1972.126  
In January 1973, trial began for seven individuals charged in connection with 
the Watergate break-in: the five burglars arrested in the DNC offices, plus 
former White House aide G. Gordon Liddy and Nixon campaign official E. 
Howard Hunt. All were charged with “conspiring to obtain information from the 
Democrats by breaking into their headquarters at the Watergate, stealing their 
documents, photographing their correspondence, wiretapping their telephones 
and planting electronic eavesdropping devices in their offices.”127 Five of the 
 
 121 Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (Jun. 18, 1972), 
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 125 White House Transcripts: Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Between the President and H.R. 
Haldeman in the Oval Office (Jun. 23, 1972).  
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seven quickly pleaded guilty,128 but two defendants, Liddy and former campaign 
security official James McCord, elected to go to trial. Both were convicted, and 
trial testimony established that Liddy had received several hundred thousand 
dollars in campaign funds to be spent on various “intelligence-gathering 
assignments.”129 But the trial left open a good number of questions about the 
origins of the funds and other participants in the charged conduct; the federal 
judge who presided over the trial, John Sirica, remarked as it ended: “I am still 
not satisfied that all the pertinent facts that might be available . . . have been 
produced before an American jury.”130  
Soon after the conclusion of the trial, Congress began its own investigation 
into the break-in. In early February 1973, the Senate voted unanimously to create 
a “Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,” later known as the 
Watergate Committee.131 That Committee ramped up its work quickly, and two 
months later, in April 1973, White House Chief of Staff Haldeman, top policy 
advisor John Ehrlichman, and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst all 
submitted their resignations; several days later White House Counsel John Dean 
was fired (or perhaps resigned after being asked to do so).132 On the night of 
April 30, Nixon addressed the nation and, for the first time, accepted 
responsibility for the Watergate scandal, while denying knowledge of the break-
in until after it had occurred.133 After announcing the departures of Kleindienst, 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean, Nixon also informed the public that he had 
selected Elliott Richardson to replace Attorney General Kleindienst.134 
Both during meetings with Senators and publicly during his confirmation 
hearings, Richardson pledged to appoint a special prosecutor,135 and the day 
after his confirmation he selected Harvard Law Professor and former Solicitor 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Lawrence Meyer, Last Two Guilty in Watergate Plot, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1973), https://www. 
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General Archibald Cox.136 Cox’s jurisdiction came to encompass not only 
Watergate but other activities of the so-called “Plumbers” operation, including 
the break-in at the offices of the psychiatrist of Pentagon Papers whistleblower 
Daniel Ellsberg, as well as allegations of exchanges of favorable treatment for 
campaign contributions and other campaign finance improprieties.137 
Around the same time that this activity was unfolding in Congress and the 
executive branch, the defendants in the Watergate burglary trial were set for 
sentencing. In March 1973, defendant James McCord sent Judge Sirica a letter 
informing him that “there was political pressure applied to the defendants to 
plead guilty and remain silent,” that “perjury occurred during the trial in matters 
highly material to the very structure, orientation, and impact of the government’s 
case, and to the motivation and intent of the defendants” and that “[o]thers 
involved in the Watergate operation were not identified during the trial, when 
they could have been by those testifying.”138  
Following the receipt of McCord’s letter, Judge Sirica took the unusual step 
of imposing lengthy “provisional” maximum sentences, up to 40 years, on a 
number of the defendants. Judge Sirica also admonished the defendants to 
continue cooperating with the still-ongoing grand jury proceedings. In his 
memoir, Sirica explains that he informed the defendants: “You will no doubt be 
given an opportunity to provide information to the grand jury . . . investigating 
the Watergate affair and to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities. I sincerely hope that each of you will take full advantage 
of any such opportunity.”139  
The McCord letter, and other developments, spurred White House Counsel 
John Dean, who had been tasked during this time with taking “day-to-day charge 
of the cover-up,”140 to begin cooperating with prosecutors regarding both the 
break-in and the cover-up. In June 1973, Dean testified before the Watergate 
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Committee, and, under a grant of testimonial immunity, detailed efforts he and 
others made to cover up the break-in, revealing that he had discussed these 
cover-up efforts with the President on a number of separate occasions.141 Then 
in July, White House aide Alexander Butterfield revealed to the Committee (and 
the world) the existence of the Oval Office recording system.142 In the ensuing 
weeks, both Special Prosecutor Cox and the Senate requested the White House 
tapes, and the President refused to turn them over.143 Cox then secured a grand 
jury subpoena, while the Watergate Committee issued its own subpoena; both 
Judge Sirica in the District Court, and the D.C. Circuit after an appeal, concluded 
that the President was required to comply with the grand jury subpoena.144 After 
the D.C. Circuit opinion, Nixon offered a compromise of written transcripts of 
some of the tapes; when Cox refused that offer, Nixon ordered him fired. That 
firing became the “Saturday Night Massacre,” after both Attorney General 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned rather 
than carry out the order, with Solicitor General Robert Bork finally executing 
the President’s directive and firing Cox.145 The public outcry that followed 
forced the President to agree to the appointment of a new Special Prosecutor, 
and by November 1973, Leon Jaworski had been named, with assurances of 
greater independence than Cox had been given.146 Some Oval Office tapes were 
subsequently turned over, and Jaworski continued the criminal investigation 
Cox’s team had begun. Then on March 1, 1974, the grand jury returned 
indictments—for conspiracy to obstruct justice, conspiracy to defraud the 
United States, and other crimes—for seven of the President’s former aides,147 
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including the former Attorney General; as the country would later learn, the 
grand jury also named President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.148  
In addition to presenting Judge Sirica with these indictments, the grand jury 
also presented the judge with a document titled “Grand Jury Report and 
Recommendation,” in which the grand jury reported that it had “heard evidence 
that it regards as having a material bearing on matters that are within the primary 
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary in its 
present investigation to determine whether sufficient grounds exist . . . to 
impeach” President Nixon.149 The Report and Recommendation, now frequently 
referred to as the “Watergate Roadmap,” continued: “it is the belief of the Grand 
Jury that it should presently defer to the House of Representatives and allow the 
House to determine what action may be warranted at this time by this 
evidence.”150 On March 18, Judge Sirica directed the delivery of the Report and 
Recommendations, together with the referenced materials, to the House 
Judiciary Committee. The Report was divided into four parts, with the fourth 
part focused on the President’s public statements.151 Without any editorializing, 
the fourth part simply listed twelve public presidential statements the grand jury 
evidently wished the Committee to consider, all involving denials of knowledge 
of, or involvement with, the Watergate break-in, cover-up, and other related 
activities.152 This report was received by the Judiciary Committee, which had 
opened a formal impeachment inquiry the month before.153  
In May 1974, after months of staff investigation, the Committee began its 
impeachment hearings. The opening statements were public and carried live on 
television, while the substantive consideration of evidence happened in 
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https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/07/archives/jury-named-nixon-a-coconspirator-but-didnt-indict-st-clair-
confirms.html. 
 149 In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence 
to the House of Representatives at 1, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter Roadmap], https://www. 
archives.gov/files/research/investigations/watergate/roadmap/docid-70105890.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2019); 
see Linda Charlton, The Scene in Sirica’s Court: A Historic 13 Minutes, N.Y. TIMES (March 2, 1974), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/03/02/archives/the-scene-in-siricas-court-a-historic-13-minutes-special-to-the-
new.html.  
 150 Roadmap, supra note 149, at 1.  
 151 Id. at 3. 
 152 Id. at 52–62. 
 153 STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, 93D CONG., REP. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 2247–48 (Comm. Print 1974). See generally JAMES D. ST. CLAIR, JOHN J. 
CHESTER, MICHAEL A. STERLACCI, JEROME J. MURPHY & LOREN A. SMITH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 15–16 (1974) [hereinafter ST. CLAIR MEMO], 
https://ia800201.us.archive.org/27/items/analysisofconsti00stcl/analysisofconsti00stcl.pdf (describing that the 
process of impeachment requires two separate actions). 
SHAWPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 11:50 AM 
2020] IMPEACHABLE SPEECH 27 
executive session, behind closed doors.154 The hearings, like the investigation 
that had preceded them, focused on Watergate, but also encompassed other 
potential abuses of power, including the creation of a so-called “enemies list,” 
the secret bombing of Cambodia, and matters relating to the use of the apparatus 
of government—including the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Secret Service—against the President’s critics and 
political opponents.155 In early July, the Committee heard testimony from nine 
witnesses, again opening its proceedings to the public; under the Committee’s 
rules, both Committee counsel and the President’s counsel questioned all of the 
witnesses, with counsel to the President then permitted to deliver closing 
remarks and a written brief.156 
Meanwhile, matters were accelerating in the Special Counsel’s Office. In 
April 1974, Jaworski issued a subpoena for the records and tapes of certain 
specified conversations between the President and various aides, beyond those 
that had already been disclosed.157 The President unsuccessfully resisted the 
subpoena in the district court.158 Then on July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that the requested materials were not shielded by executive 
privilege, and that the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality was not 
sufficient to overcome the need for access to the materials in the context of a 
pending criminal proceeding.159  
Three days after the Supreme Court’s decision, on July 27, 1974, the House 
Judiciary Committee began holding votes on proposed articles of impeachment. 
In the end, the committee approved three articles. The first, discussed at greater 
length below, charged the President with obstruction of the Watergate 
investigation; it was approved by the Committee 27 to 11.160 The second 
concerned abuse of power; this far-ranging article alleged use of the IRS for 
unlawful taxpayer audits and investigations; use of the FBI to conduct 
surveillance and investigations for purposes unrelated to national security or law 
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enforcement; and the maintenance and use of a secret investigative unit inside 
the White House, known as “the Plumbers,” which was funded by campaign 
contributions and used CIA resources to engage in covert and unlawful 
activities.161 This article was approved 28 to 10.162 The third article focused on 
the President’s failure to comply with Committee subpoenas, and his general 
refusal to cooperate with congressional investigators.163 This vote was closer 
than the others: the article was approved 21 to 17.164 Two other articles of 
impeachment were considered but not approved by the committee. The first 
“charged that the President had concealed the bombing in Cambodia from the 
Congress and that he had submitted, personally and through his aides, false and 
misleading statements to the Congress concerning that bombing.”165 That article 
failed by a vote of 12 to 26.166 The second unsuccessful article charged the 
President with failing to report income and claiming unlawful deductions on his 
tax returns; it also alleged that he had received unlawful emoluments in the form 
of “government expenditures at his privately owned properties at San Clemente, 
California, and Key Biscayne, Florida.”167 Like the article involving the 
bombing of Cambodia, this article failed 12 to 26.168  
The first approved article of impeachment charged the President with 
unlawful activities as part of a plan “to obstruct the investigation of the 
Watergate break-in and to cover up other unlawful activities.”169 The President’s 
public statements about the break-in, and his activities around the statements 
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made by others, were at the center of this charge: “For more than two years, 
[Nixon] . . . continuously denied any direction of or participation in a plan to 
cover up and conceal the identities of those who authorized the burglaries and 
the existence and scope of other unlawful and covert activities committed in the 
President’s interest and on his behalf.”170 The article described a course of 
conduct that included: 
[M]aking false or misleading public statements for the purpose of 
deceiving the people of the United States into believing that a thorough 
and complete investigation had been conducted with respect to 
allegations of misconduct on the part of personnel of the executive 
branch of the United States and personnel of the Committee for the 
Re-election of the President, and that there was no involvement of such 
personnel in such misconduct . . . . In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has 
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of 
constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law 
and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United 
States.171 
The Judiciary Committee Report supported this charge with a comprehensive 
detailing of the President’s public statements. The list included a June 1972 news 
conference in which the President claimed that his press secretary had spoken 
accurately about Watergate when he maintained that “[t]he White House ha[d] 
no involvement whatever in this particular incident”;172 an August 1972 speech 
in which the President claimed that investigations into Watergate had the White 
House’s “total cooperation,” and that John Dean had conducted a “complete 
investigation of all leads which might involve any present members of the White 
House Staff,” and that Dean’s investigation had uncovered that “no one in the 
White House Staff, no one in this Administration, presently employed, was 
involved in this very bizarre incident”;173 and an April 1973 address in which he 
suggested he had been misled by staff members into believing there had been no 
White House or campaign involvement in the break-in or cover-up.174 
The Report described the Committee’s views on the presidential conduct and 
rhetoric at issue in this impeachment article in this way:  
President Nixon’s course of conduct following the Watergate break-
in . . . required perjury, destruction of evidence, obstruction of justice, 
 
 170 Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 27 
(1974). 
 171 Id. at 2–3. 
 172 Id. at 27. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 28. 
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all crimes. But, most important, it required deliberate, contrived, and 
continuing deception of the American people. President Nixon’s 
actions resulted in manifest injury to the confidence of the nation and 
great prejudice to the cause of law and justice, and was subversive of 
constitutional government. His actions were contrary to his trust as 
President and unmindful of the solemn duties of his high office. It was 
this serious violation of President Richard M. Nixon’s constitutional 
obligations as President, and not the fact that violations of federal 
criminal statutes occurred, that lies at the heart of Article I.175 
The Report’s discussion of Article II, the catch-all abuse-of-power charge, also 
identified the President’s public deception as a component of the misconduct it 
deemed impeachable. As the report explained, “[i]n considering this Article the 
Committee has relied on evidence of acts directly attributable to Richard M. 
Nixon himself. He has repeatedly attempted to conceal his accountability for 
these acts and attempted to deceive and mislead the American people about his 
own responsibility.”176 
In addition to the articles and the Committee Report, the Committee debates 
shed some light on the Committee’s consideration of these matters—although 
they occurred before the release of the most damning of the Oval Office tapes. 
In his opening statement, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino 
foregrounded the President’s public speech:  
In his statement of April 30, 1973, President Nixon told the American 
people that he had been deceived by subordinates into believing that 
none of the members of his administration or his personal campaign 
committee were implicated in the Watergate break-in. . . . It must be 
decided whether the President was deceived by his subordinates . . . or 
whether, in fact, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of the sacred 
obligation of his constitutional oath, has used the power of his high 
office for over 2 years to cover up and conceal responsibility for the 
Watergate burglary and other activities of a similar nature. 
Rodino continued:  
[T]he Committee has to decide whether in his statement of April 30 
and other public statements the President was telling the truth to the 
American people, or whether that statement and other statements were 
part of a pattern of conduct designed not to take care that the laws 
 
 175 Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
 176 Id. at 182.  
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were faithfully executed, but to impede their faithful execution for his 
political interest and on his behalf.177  
During the debates, some members, like California Democratic Congressman 
Jerome Waldie, repeatedly invoked the President’s public statements,178 while 
supporters of the President, like Republican Congressman Charles Wiggins, 
raised concerns about the propriety of citing press conferences in articles of 
impeachment.179  
The final Oval Office tapes, including the so-called “smoking gun” tape that 
conclusively established President Nixon’s active involvement in the cover-up, 
were released several days after the committee vote.180 Nixon resigned days 
later.181 Several days after that, Congressman Wiggins and other Republicans 
who had initially opposed impeachment released statements indicating that they 
had come to support the first article of impeachment—the obstruction-of-justice 
charge, which relied most heavily on the President’s public statements—though 
they continued to believe that none of the other articles satisfied the 
constitutional standard.182 
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski suggested in his memoir that the 
President’s public speeches were, if not central to his actions as prosecutor, at 
least atmospherically quite significant; upon learning that the White House 
would release the tapes and the President would make a statement 
acknowledging that some of the tapes revealed his involvement in the Watergate 
coverup, Jaworski wrote, “[T]he revelation was the end of a nightmare. The 
galling frustration I had experienced for long months as Nixon continued to 
mislead the public was over.”183 
 
 177 Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings on H.R. Res. 803 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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of the United States lied to the American people, not incidentally to an investigator, lied to the American people 
as the result of a press conference.”). 
 180 President’s Statement About Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/ 
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 181 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at A01. 
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C. Bill Clinton: “Mis[leading] his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation 
to conceal the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky” 
Presidential statements, including public statements, also played a 
significant role in the early stages of the impeachment of President Bill Clinton; 
although the language explicitly identifying the President’s public statements 
was stripped out of the relevant article of impeachment during debates in the 
House Judiciary Committee, the Committee’s (and the President’s) treatment of 
that language, and of the presidential speech at issue, is a fascinating and 
underappreciated dimension of the story of Bill Clinton’s impeachment.  
On September 9, 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr delivered to the 
House of Representatives the document that came to be known as the “Starr 
Report.”184 He did so pursuant to the now-lapsed Independent Counsel statute, 
which required an independent counsel to “advise the House of Representatives 
of any substantial and credible information which such independent counsel 
receives, in carrying out the independent counsel’s responsibilities under this 
chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.”185 Although Starr’s 
initial 1994 appointment under the Independent Counsel statute had directed him 
to investigate possible crimes related to real estate investments Bill and Hillary 
Clinton made while still in Arkansas,186 Starr was eventually granted additional 
authority to investigate a number of unrelated matters—including, most 
significantly, potential perjury and obstruction of justice involving President 
Clinton’s affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky.187 In the end, that 
conduct was the subject of both the Starr Report and the impeachment 
proceedings that grew out of it. 
The narrative portion of the Starr Report contained a detailed account of 
President Clinton’s relationship with Lewinsky.188 The second half of the report 
listed eleven “Acts that May Constitute Grounds for Impeachment.”189 Five of 
 
 184 See Communication from Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel, Transmitting a Referral to the 
United States House of Representatives Filed in Conformity with the Requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 595(c), H.R. 
REP. No. 105-310, at 1 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter Starr Report].  
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 186 See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 605 
(1998). 
 187 In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998). 
 188 Starr Report, supra note 184, at 11–95. 
 189 Id. at III. 
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the “Acts” involved lies under oath, in a variety of settings;190 five involved 
obstruction of justice and attempts to obstruct justice.191  
The last of the eleven “Acts” swept most broadly and did not track any 
particular criminal offense. Its opening summation argued: “There is substantial 
and credible information that President Clinton’s actions since January 17, 1998, 
regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky have been inconsistent with 
the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.”192 This section 
of the report contained the most extensive discussion of public speech. It 
reiterated the charges from the first ten grounds: that the President “attempted to 
conceal the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from the judicial 
process in the Jones case,” a civil suit against the President by former state 
employee Paula Jones,193 and that he also “lied under oath to the grand jury.”194 
But it also focused on statements the President had made publicly, rather than in 
the Jones litigation or before Starr’s grand jury. As the report detailed, “[t]he 
President . . . misled the American people and the Congress in his public 
statement of January 26, 1998, in which he denied ‘sexual relations’ with Ms. 
Lewinsky.”195 The report emphasized that “the President’s emphatic denial to 
the American people was false. And his statement was not an impromptu 
comment in the heat of a press conference. To the contrary, it was an intentional 
and calculated falsehood to deceive the Congress and the American people.”196 
The report then discussed a public statement made in August 1998: “[T]he 
president again made false statements to the American people and Congress, 
contending that his answers in his civil deposition had been ‘legally 
accurate.’”197 This section of the report also pointed to statements by the 
President’s Cabinet, staff members, and the First Lady, all of whom relied upon 
and amplified the President’s denials.198 As the report summarized, “[c]oupled 
with the President’s firm denial, the united front of the President’s closest 
 
 190 Id. at III (outlining charges and grounds for impeachment in I–IV, VIII). 
 191 Id. at III–IV (outlining charges and grounds for impeachment in V–VII, IX–X). 
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advisors helped shape perception of the issue.”199 In its conclusion to this 
section, the report maintained that the President “made and caused to be made 
false statements to the American people about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky,” that he also “made false statements about whether he had lied under 
oath or otherwise obstructed justice,” and that “this represent[ed] substantial and 
credible information that may constitute grounds for impeachment.”200 
Congress publicly released the report two days after receiving it;201 on the 
same day, the President issued a response to the report. The response explained, 
“The President has acknowledged misleading his family, staff and the country 
about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he has apologized 
and asked for forgiveness.”202 But the response argued that this “personal failing 
does not constitute a criminal abuse of power. If allowing aides to repeat 
misleading statements is a crime, then any number of public officials are guilty 
of misusing their office for as long as they fail to admit wrongdoing in response 
to any allegation about their activities.”203 Later, the response drew a contrast to 
President Nixon’s false statements, explaining that those statements “were part 
of a scheme to obstruct justice through the perjury of his senior staff, through 
payoffs to criminal defendants, and through use of the [CIA] to thwart an FBI 
investigation into crimes in which he was involved . . . . Merely to describe that 
conduct makes clear how different it is[.]”204  
Events moved quickly after public release of the Starr Report and the 
President’s initial response. Less than a month after Congress received the 
report, the House Judiciary Committee voted to open a formal impeachment 
inquiry,205 and days later, on October 8, the full House approved the inquiry 
resolution by a vote of 258 to 176.206 On November 9, the Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on the “Background and 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 210. The last section of the Report also discussed at length the President’s invocation of executive 
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History of Impeachment,”207 featuring testimony by a number of scholars of 
history and the Constitution.  
Impeachment hearings began on November 19, 1998. After opening 
statements by the Chair and Ranking Member, Independent Counsel Ken Starr 
testified.208 He provided a detailed summary of the contents of the report, 
including describing the President’s “political strategy” for responding to public 
reporting on his relationship with Monica Lewinsky: 
First, the President denied the truth publicly and 
emphatically . . . political polling led to Hollywood staging. The 
President’s California friend and producer Harry Thomason flew to 
Washington and advised the President that the President needed to be 
very forceful in denying the relationship. On Monday, January 26, in 
the Roosevelt Room, before Members of Congress and other citizens, 
the President provided a clear and emphatic public statement denying 
the relationship. The President also made false statements to his 
Cabinet and to his aides. They then spoke publicly and professed their 
belief in the President.209  
On December 4, the House Judiciary Committee began debating articles of 
impeachment.210 On December 11, the Committee approved three articles on a 
party-line vote.211 Two accused the President of perjury, both before Ken Starr’s 
grand jury and in civil depositions in the Jones litigation; one alleged obstruction 
of justice in both the Jones case and the Starr investigation.212 The next day, 
December 12, the Committee considered a fourth article—one much more 
concerned with the public-facing statements and actions of the President. The 
initial draft of that article, captioned “Abuse of Power,” largely tracked the 
eleventh section of the Starr Report, alleging that the President had “misused 
and abused his office and impaired the administration of justice” in the following 
ways: 
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(1) As President, using the attributes of office, William Jefferson 
Clinton willfully made false and misleading public statements for the 
purpose of deceiving the people of the United States in order to 
continue concealing his misconduct and to escape accountability for 
such misconduct. 
(2) As President, using the attributes of office, William Jefferson 
Clinton willfully made false and misleading public statements to 
members of his cabinet, and White House aides, so that these Federal 
employees would repeat such false and misleading statements 
publicly, thereby utilizing public resources for the purpose of 
deceiving the people of the United States, in order to continue 
concealing his misconduct and to escape accountability for such 
misconduct. The false and misleading statements made by William 
Jefferson Clinton to members of his cabinet and White House aides 
were repeated by those members and aides, causing the people of the 
United States to receive false and misleading information from high 
government officials. 
. . .  
In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity 
of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his 
trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of 
law, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.213 
The first two paragraphs of this fourth Article, then, focused on public lies and 
misrepresentations, both those made by the President directly, and those made 
by subordinates—who either acted upon the urging or instruction of the 
President or simply repeated the President’s untrue statements. 
As debate in the House Judiciary Committee began on this fourth article, 
Pennsylvania Representative George Gekas, a Republican, introduced an 
amendment to strike several paragraphs from the article—the two excerpted 
above, and one about assertions of executive privilege—leaving only one 
paragraph regarding perjury before, and refusal to respond to requests from, the 
Judiciary Committee.214 Then-Congressman Chuck Schumer voiced his strong 
support for the amendment: “The most absurd thing in this entire bill of 
impeachment is to say that, when the President speaks to the public or his 
Cabinet, quote, ‘for the purposes of deceiving people of the United States in 
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order to continue concealing his misconduct,’ that that should be an article of 
impeachment.”215 Others echoed this sentiment.216  
The Gekas amendment was adopted by a vote of 29 to 5, with three Members 
voting present.217 Representative Goodlatte, who voted for the amendment, 
explained his vote this way: 
I think that no one should take from the decision to delete these three 
sections of the article that we don’t severely abhor the actions of the 
President in regard to these three sections. I believe that the allegations 
contained in them are all true. I believe the President of the United 
States did lie to the American people. I do believe the President lied to 
his cabinet and others, and I think that he hoped that in so doing that 
they would carry forth his lies and I think that is wrong as well. But, 
I . . . don’t believe that any of these . . . items are impeachable 
offenses. And as a result, I’ll support this amendment.218 
The House Committee’s Impeachment Report devoted substantial attention to 
the elimination of these sections of the fourth article. The Report explained that 
“several members had expressed grave concern regarding the President’s lies to 
the American people with respect to the Paula Jones lawsuit, Monica 
Lewinsky[,] and his potential criminal culpability.”219 It elaborated: 
“The . . . public trust . . . was deliberately abused by President Clinton when he 
made these false statements. . . . The political powers that accompany the Office 
of the President do not include misleading the American public in an attempt to 
avoid or thwart federal investigation.”220 The Report explained, however, that 
“it was the measured judgment of most Committee members that these 
statements did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, although the 
Committee does believe that Presidential lies to the American public could 
constitute an impeachable offense in other circumstances.”221  
After adopting the Gekas Amendment, the House Judiciary Committee 
approved the amended fourth article by the same 21 to 16 party-line vote as the 
first three articles, and the four articles proceeded to the floor of the House of 
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Representatives.222 On December 19, 1998, the full House approved two of the 
four articles of impeachment, one for perjury and one for obstruction of justice, 
making Clinton the first President to be impeached since Andrew Johnson.223  
Following the House vote, the President filed a formal answer to the articles 
of impeachment. That answer offered this concession: “The President 
acknowledges that . . . he misled his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation 
to conceal the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.”224 In light of the 
fact that the article based on public lies and misstatements had not been approved 
by the full House, it is telling that the President nevertheless chose to address 
those matters in his response. 
On January 7, 1999, the second presidential impeachment trial in history 
began in the Senate, with Chief Justice William Rehnquist presiding.225 
Procedurally, the Senate drew heavily on the precedent of the Johnson 
impeachment.226 The trial took just over a month, with the House Managers 
focusing their case on establishing the elements of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, and Clinton’s team offering a narrative of private misconduct unrelated 
to what they maintained were the core purposes of impeachment—punishing 
and deterring political offenses and violations of public trust. Both sides made 
reference to public statements, although those statements were not a part of the 
formal impeachment charges. The House Managers’ trial memo linked perjury 
to public statements in its opening summation, charging that “By his pattern of 
lies under oath, misleading statements and deceit, he has seriously undermined 
the integrity and credibility of the Office of President and thereby the honor and 
integrity of the United States.”227 Later, in a section captioned “Effect on Office 
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of the Presidency,” the same trial memo argued that the President’s lies and 
misstatements, both under oath and more generally to the public, undermined 
both the “econom[y] and national defense”; the memo maintained that “the 
President is the spokesman for the government and the people of the United 
States concerning both domestic and foreign matters,” so that when “that 
spokesman is guilty of a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and 
deceits over a long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements 
is seriously called into question. . . . what does that do to confidence in the honor 
and integrity of the United States?”228  
On February 12, after private deliberations, the perjury charge failed by a 
vote of 45 to 55,229 and the obstruction of justice charge failed by a vote of 50 to 
50.230  
Most Senators provided some public explanation for their votes, many 
mentioning the President’s public statements. Senator Carl Levin voted against 
impeachment but expressed support for a censure resolution, explaining, “While 
I do not believe the President’s conduct in his private, consensual sexual 
relationship should have become the business of the American public, it did in 
fact become so, and when it did the President had the duty to tell the truth.”231 
Daniel Akaka, another Senate Democrat who voted against impeachment, 
agreed that “[c]ertain facts are indisputable” and that among those were that “the 
President lied to the American people and to his wife and daughter about an 
extramarital affair.”232 Still, he concluded, “impeachment and removal from 
office should only be used for crimes against the country or threats to our 
national security,” a standard he maintained was not satisfied here.233  
II. ANALYSIS: IMPEACHABLE SPEECH 
This Part attempts to identify some of the general themes that emerge from 
considering these three historical episodes together. It first asks about the 
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function and limits of congressional precedent in debates about impeachment, 
then explores the intersection of impeachment with the rhetorical presidency. It 
next categorizes the forms of presidential speech that have figured in presidential 
impeachment proceedings, and it concludes by identifying and evaluating 
potential constitutional defenses to attempts to predicate impeachment in part or 
in full on presidential speech. 
A. The Function of Precedent in Impeachment 
When it comes to debates about impeachment, one important antecedent 
question concerns the value of congressional precedent.234 Even if the history 
revealed a clear congressional consensus about the proper objects of 
impeachment at particular moments in time, it is far from clear that such history 
would bind any future Congress in the same way a precedent of the Supreme 
Court presumptively binds a future Supreme Court.235 But the question is purely 
hypothetical: as the foregoing discussion makes clear, impeachment history is 
complex and contested, with each of the key presidential impeachment 
precedents reflecting a sharp division between House and Senate, and a degree 
of internal division within each chamber.236 Still, the political branches have 
long placed significant weight on their own past practice, even if, as is often the 
case, past practice is subject to conflicting interpretation; indeed, “[a]ll 
established political orders incorporate the institutional memory embodied in 
‘long-term accretions of practice.’”237 That is emphatically not to suggest that 
the particular offenses identified in the three episodes described above, or the 
conclusions reached by the decisionmakers in those cases, circumscribe the 
options available to any future Congress. But the history is relevant, and it 
warrants consideration.238 
 
 234 This question is especially important because in impeachment, all relevant precedent is political-branch 
precedent. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (concluding that a challenge to the Senate’s 
impeachment procedures presents a nonjusticiable political question). 
 235 Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 
631, 646 (1999) (“If impeachment is a mixed operation of law and politics, the appropriate role of ‘precedent’ 
is uncertain.”). 
 236 Cf. BENEDICT, supra note 58, at 29 (describing the 1868 Congress considering Andrew Johnson’s 
impeachment as having “two distinct lines of precedents on which to draw. On one hand, an investigator might 
argue that the true precedents for impeachment were those set by the House of Representatives in presenting 
impeachments to the Senate. On the other, he might insist that the true precedents lay in how the Senate decided 
the cases”). 
 237 Trevor Morrison & Samuel Issacharoff, Constitution by Convention, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020); JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress on Presidential Removal Power, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 
453 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999) (“[I]f it relates to a doubtful part of the constitution, . . . an exposition of the 
constitution may come with as much propriety from the legislature as any other department of government.”). 
 238 Cf. Keith Whittington, A Formidable Weapon of Faction?, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 
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It is also possible to question the wisdom of relying on impeachments that 
were not “successful” in any ultimate sense. On this logic, because none of the 
three impeachments I consider resulted in the president’s conviction and 
removal from office by the Senate, these historical chapters offer little guidance 
as to the correct constitutional definitions or standards. (And the Nixon 
impeachment, which is broadly viewed as involving presidential conduct that 
clearly did warrant not only impeachment but conviction and removal, rests on 
a historical counterfactual.) But that criticism applies to any sustained thinking 
about impeachment that grapples with history, since no president has ever been 
removed by the Senate. And even without any removals, history surely offers 
insights into what individual members and each house of Congress heard, said, 
and concluded regarding the circumstances under which impeachment and 
removal are justified. Indeed, many scholars have maintained that when it comes 
to impeachment, “the Nation’s practice between ratification and the present is 
no less important for interpretive purposes than the Nation’s understanding in 
1787 and 1788.”239 And impeachment involves core separation-of-powers 
questions, where historical practice has long been relied upon in judicial 
interpretation;240 if courts consider history in this sphere, surely it is appropriate 
for Congress to do the same. One final rejoinder is that in impeachment, as 
elsewhere in law and politics, failure and success may not stand in a relationship 
of strict opposition. For example, although Congress did not actually impeach 
and remove President Nixon, the general goal of holding to account a lawless 
president was still arguably achieved.241 And although Andrew Johnson 
 
2020) (manuscript at 11) (“The history of federal impeachments has built up some precedents that can help cabin 
disagreements over how the impeachment should be used, but is has not—and probably cannot—eliminate the 
prospect of future disputes over the impeachment power.”).  
 239 Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 281 (1998). See generally David 
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 886 (1996) (identifying “the 
need to reinterpret or ‘translate’ the Framers’ commands in ways that take account of, for example, changes in 
factual knowledge and social understandings that have occurred since the Constitution was adopted”). 
 240 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It 
is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the 
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”); see also NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 
513, 514 (2014) (explaining that because the Recess Appointments Clause concerns the separation of powers, 
“in interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice”) (emphasis omitted). For scholarly 
discussions of “gloss” analysis, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 59 (2017) 
(“For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four . . . justifications: 
deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean 
consequentialism; and reliance interests.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 479 (2012) (reexamining “the premises and implications of the 
idea of institutional acquiescence in particular, and of the role of historical practice more generally”). 
 241 Examples from other spheres abound. See TULIS & MELLOW, supra note 117, at 5 (offering a new 
understanding of three critical constitutional “antimoments,” and arguing that the Anti-Federalists, Andrew 
Johnson, and Barry Goldwater, all of whom were “regarded by their contemporaries as the losers in the 
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emerged victorious from his Senate trial, he failed even to secure his party’s 
nomination for president later that same year.242 
B. Impeaching “The Rhetorical President” 
The next significant question concerns the relationship between the full 
flowering of the “rhetorical presidency” and the constitutional politics of 
impeachment. As Jeffrey Tulis demonstrates in his canonical The Rhetorical 
Presidency, the vision of the founding generation, which informed the practice 
of virtually every president until the twentieth century, rejected the use of 
presidential popular or mass rhetoric,243 instead creating a set of general 
prescriptions under which most presidential rhetoric “would be written, and 
addressed principally to Congress,”244 and where the president’s limited public-
facing speeches would “emphasize[] popular instruction in constitutional 
principle and the articulation of the general tenor and direction of presidential 
policy, while tending to avoid discussion of the merits of particular policy 
proposals.”245  
The framers seem to have been driven here by an acute fear of the dangers 
of demagoguery. As Keith Whittington explains, “At the time of the founding, 
demagoguery was seen as a central threat to the stability of democratic regimes, 
and popular rhetoric was associated with the power to sway the masses behind 
a charismatic leader who would break the fetters of constitutional office.”246 And 
indeed, the figure of the demagogue stalks much founding-era writing. The very 
first of the Federalist Papers warned of the “perverted ambition” of men who 
“hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country.”247 
Federalist 85, Hamilton’s closing argument in support of the Constitution, 
argued that adoption of the Constitution was needed to impose restraints on “the 
ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and 
influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the 
 
immediate contests in which they engaged,” still “decisively shaped the subsequent course of American 
politics”); cf. Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (2010) (in litigation, “[l]oss 
may yield . . . indirect effects”). 
 242 Johnson also entered a number of compromises with congressional Republicans during the pendency 
of his impeachment, perhaps most significantly agreeing to nominate the moderate John Schofield as his War 
Secretary. See STEWART, supra note 66, at 225. 
 243 JEFFREY TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 9 (2d ed. 2017); see also Katherine Shaw, Beyond the 
Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017).  
 244 TULIS, supra note 243, at 46. 
 245 Id. at 47. 
 246 Whittington, supra note 66, at 435. 
 247 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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people;” Hamilton went on to warn that failure to ratify the Constitution could 
lead to “the military despotism of a victorious demagogue.”248 While neither the 
first nor the last of the Federalist Papers mentioned impeachment directly, others 
did, including the famous Federalist 65;249 and of course, the Constitution whose 
adoption the Federalist collection urged contained impeachment as an important 
check on the president.250 James Madison made the connection between 
demagoguery and impeachment more explicit in a 1789 speech on the topic of 
the presidential removal power, in which he warned about “unworthy” leaders251 
as well as “ambitious or designing characters.”252 While Madison explained that 
the trust the Constitution reposed in the president was a “high one, and in some 
degree perhaps a dangerous one,”253 he also noted the presence of the 
impeachment remedy—available “at all times”254—in a way that arguably 
linked impeachment to presidential abuses that were rhetorical in character. And 
George Washington’s Farewell Address warned of “cunning, ambitious, and 
unprincipled men” who would “usurp for themselves the reins of government, 
destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust 
domination.”255 
Writing several decades later, James Fenimore Cooper warned that “the true 
theater of a demagogue is democracy,” and elaborated on the nature of the 
demagogue, in now-classic formulations: a leader whose goal is to “advance his 
own interests, by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the people,” who 
“appeals to passion and prejudices rather than to reason,” and who is “a man of 
intrigue and deception, of sly cunning and management.”256  
 
 248 THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Bob Bauer, A President’s Words Matter, Part 
II: Impeachment Standards and the Case of the Demagogue, LAWFARE (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidents-words-matter-part-ii-impeachment-standards-and-case-demagogue. 
 249 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 250 Id. 
 251 MADISON, supra note 237, at 454; see also Bauer, supra note 248 (surveying founding-era materials). 
 252 MADISON, supra note 237, at 453. 
 253 Id.  
 254 Id. at 454. 
 255 George Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address 1796, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale. 
edu/18th_century/washing.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2020). 
 256 JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, On Demagogues, in THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT AND OTHER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 99–100 (1838). More recent writings on demagoguery borrow heavily from this formulation, though 
also emphasizing the centrality of identifying and exploiting divisions. Patricia Roberts-Miller, for example, 
writes that “demagoguery is discourse that promises stability, certainty, and escape . . . by framing public policy 
in terms of the degree to which and the means by which . . . the out-group should be scapegoated for the current 
problems of the in-group.” PATRICIA ROBERTS-MILLER, DEMAGOGUERY AND DEMOCRACY 33 (2017); see 
MICHAEL SIGNER, DEMAGOGUE: THE FIGHT TO SAVE DEMOCRACY FROM ITS WORST ENEMIES 35 (2009) (“As 
Cooper recognized, true demagogues meet four rules: (1) They fashion themselves as a man or woman of the 
common people, as opposed to the elites; (2) their politics depends on a powerful, visceral connection with the 
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On Tulis’s telling, this founding-era limitation on popular presidential 
rhetoric effectively shaped the office of president until the administrations of 
Teddy Roosevelt, who coined the term “the bully pulpit,”257 and Woodrow 
Wilson, under whom the presidency acquired its contemporary rhetorical 
character.258 For at least a century, then, popular rhetoric has been a core feature 
of presidential governance. And there is no real question that today, it is widely 
understood that “Presidents have a duty constantly to defend themselves 
publicly, to promote policy initiatives nationwide, and to inspirit the 
population.”259  
All of the episodes discussed above occurred within a framework in which 
presidential rhetoric had already taken on its contemporary character. Both 
Nixon and Clinton held the office well within the age of the “rhetorical 
president” (albeit with differing access to modes of mass communication).260 
And although Johnson’s administration predated the early twentieth-century 
shift, Tulis identifies Johnson as the “exception that proves the rule”—a 
nineteenth-century president who alone ignored the then-applicable limitations 
on popular presidential rhetoric, and faced formal sanction in the form of 
impeachment.261  
There are several possible lessons to draw from considering the rhetorical 
presidency alongside questions of impeachment practice. First, the 
contemporary presidency’s imperative of constant public address may mean that 
it is critical to draw clear boundaries around the categories of presidential speech 
that might be subject to impeachment; any other approach might open the door 
to routine invocation of the impeachment process, of the sort de Tocqueville 
warned against,262 for something that has become a central feature of the 
 
people that dramatically transcends ordinary political popularity; (3) they manipulate this connection, and the 
raging popularity it affords, for their own benefit and ambition; and (4) they threaten or outright break 
established rules of conduct, institutions, and even the law.”); ADAM HODGES, WHEN WORDS TRUMP POLITICS 
15 (2020) (defining demagoguery as a term used “to designate leaders who use prejudicial appeals rather than 
rational arguments to mobilize the people”); see also JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 4–5 (2016); 
STEPHEN F. KNOTT, THE LOST SOUL OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: THE DECLINE INTO DEMAGOGUERY AND 
THE PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL xiv (2019). 
 257 DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND 
THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOURNALISM xi (2013) (“The essence of Roosevelt’s leadership . . . lay in his enterprising 
use of the ‘bully pulpit,’ a phrase he himself coined to describe the national platform the presidency provides to 
shape public sentiment and mobilize action.”). 
 258 TULIS, supra note 243, at 3–4. 
 259 Id. at 4. 
 260 SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 2, 11–12 (3d ed. 
1997). 
 261 TULIS, supra note 243, at 87–90. 
 262 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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contemporary presidency. Indeed, during each of the impeachment episodes 
discussed above, some members of Congress raised concerns about too 
cavalierly concluding that presidential speech might be impeachable. Then-
Congressman Chuck Schumer, for example, described the original fourth article 
of impeachment against Bill Clinton as “absurd” for its identification of lies to 
the public and the Cabinet as impeachable.263 As Schumer elaborated, “I 
think . . . if that article is significant enough for impeachment . . . then you could 
find people of goodwill and total honesty feel that every President should be 
impeached under that article—every single one.”264 
On the other hand, it may be precisely because we have moved so far from 
the conception of presidential rhetoric that animated the framers that it is 
necessary to take seriously the possibility of impeachment for at least some 
categories of presidential speech. The dissolution of the original constraints on 
presidential speech may mean that impeachment is the only remaining 
constitutional mechanism for responding to certain categories of presidential 
rhetoric. If the norms and expectations that once constrained presidential speech 
have ceased to operate, perhaps the impeachment mechanism must adapt to these 
new conditions.  
C. Lies and Misstatements 
What, then, does the history show about the categories of presidential speech 
that might be subject to impeachment? As is clear from the sections above, lies 
and misstatements played a significant role in the impeachment proceedings 
against both Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton. False statements are of course 
central to perjury, which, under federal law, consists of intentional false sworn 
statements;265 in some cases, even unsworn false statements to federal officials, 
including to Congress, may constitute crimes.266 And indeed, in the case of Bill 
Clinton, lies before the grand jury and in the Jones civil lawsuit formed the basis 
of two of the stand-alone impeachment charges approved by the House Judiciary 
Committee, and one approved by the full House. But my interest here is 
 
 263 Testing of a President; Excerpts from the House Judiciary Committee’s Debate on Article IV, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/13/us/testing-president-excerpts-house-judiciary-
committee-s-debate-article-iv.html. 
 264 Id. 
 265 The general federal perjury statute, for example, states that “Whoever— 
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United 
States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any 
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such 
oath, states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1621.  
 266 18 U.S.C.§ 1001. 
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primarily in the kinds of lies that are not or not necessarily indictable felonies: 
lies that are made before the public, outside of the context of any formal legal 
proceedings.  
The first article of impeachment against Richard Nixon, approved by the 
Judiciary Committee 27 to 11,267 supplies the best example of this category. That 
article charged that: “For more than two years, Richard M. Nixon continuously 
denied any direction of or participation in a plan to cover up and conceal the 
identities of those who authorized the burglaries and scope of other unlawful and 
covert activities committed in the President’s interest and on his behalf,”268 
including “making or causing to be made false or misleading public statements 
for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United States.”269  
One way to understand the Judiciary Committee’s inclusion of Nixon’s 
public lies in this article is as representing the position that lies of this sort—that 
is, those with a tight connection to a course of conduct, or particular acts, that 
may themselves be deemed by Congress to constitute “high crimes and 
misdemeanors”—may properly be subject to impeachment. Here, the 
President’s lies were one component of an effort to conceal misconduct, where 
both the misconduct and the overall concealment constituted abuses of authority. 
Another possibility is that the Committee concluded that these lies were in some 
sense political, perhaps beyond the sense in which Hamilton described the 
political nature of impeachable conduct in Federalist 65:270 here, the lies were 
designed to conceal acts linked to a political contest—burglarizing an 
opponent’s campaign offices—with the goal of entrenching the President, a 
political actor, in power.  
By contrast, in the case of Bill Clinton, the Judiciary Committee appears to 
have concluded that at least some presidential lies and untruths, in particular 
those that pertain to private rather than political actions by the President, should 
be disregarded when pursuing impeachment. Recall that the Committee 
considered and debated including Clinton’s public lies about Monica 
Lewinsky—in particular his denials of any relationship with Lewinsky—in the 
fourth article of impeachment. It is telling that despite the Committee’s 
composition—it was controlled by Republican members who did not hesitate to 
 
 267 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  
 268 Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 27 
(1974). 
 269 Id. at 22. 
 270 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing impeachable acts as “those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public 
trust”). 
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vote to impeach President Clinton over perjury and obstruction of justice—it 
determined that the President’s public lies about Monica Lewinsky had no place 
in an impeachment article.271 As the Committee Report explained, although “the 
public trust . . . was deliberately abused by President Clinton” when he made 
false statements to the public,272 those statements “did not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.”273 The Committee did conclude by noting, however, that 
“Presidential lies to the American public could constitute an impeachable 
offense in other circumstances.”274 
The 1998 Judiciary Committee was not alone in drawing this distinction. 
Bob Bauer, for example, has written that “[w]hat a president lies about makes 
all the difference in judging whether his falsehoods rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense. Some blatant misrepresentations, while reprehensible, 
matter only in the court of public opinion and at the polls.”275 As an example of 
the sort of presidential lie that would cross the line to impeachable, Bauer offers 
a president’s lies to conceal his efforts to solicit foreign election 
interference276—tracking the basic distinction identified above. And Helen 
Norton, who has written extensively about lies by government officials, argues 
that although under extreme circumstances some government lies might 
undermine due process or free speech principles,277 most of the time “political 
remedies” like impeachment represent the best check on official falsehoods.278  
D. Incitement 
Consider, next, the possibility of impeachment for presidential statements 
that in some sense constitute incitement—that are designed to lead and likely to 
lead, in the doctrinal formulation courts typically use,279 to imminent lawless 
 
 271 See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text. 
 272 Id.  
 273 Id.  
 274 Id. 
 275 Bob Bauer, Some Presidential Lies Are Impeachable Offenses, ATLANTIC (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/some-presidential-lies-are-impeachable-offenses/573421/. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 75–76 (2015) (“The 
government’s lies violate the Due Process Clause when they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or 
property or when they are sufficiently coercive to constitute the functional equivalent of such deprivations,” and 
“violate the Free Speech Clause when they are sufficiently coercive of their targets’ beliefs or speech to 
constitute the functional equivalent of the government’s direct regulation of that expressive activity.”). 
 278 Id. at 108; see also HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 227–28 
(2019).  
 279 As Neal Katyal has suggested, and as the discussion above presumes, when Congress engages in 
constitutional interpretation—either in the context of impeachment or generally—it need not adhere to judicial 
formulations. Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAW & 
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action.280 The Andrew Johnson saga supplies the most significant precedent 
here, although in some ways Congress’s failure to more explicitly identify 
incitement is the most striking aspect of the tenth and eleventh articles of 
impeachment. Recall that during one of Johnson’s most notorious “swing around 
the circle” speeches, Johnson asked the crowd, “Why don’t you hang Thad[deus] 
Stevens and Wendell Phillips?”281 Earlier, he had described those same 
congressional figures as a “posse of maniacs and revolutionists” that were 
“conspiring to overthrow the government.”282 And yet the Reconstruction 
Congress did not focus on this speech, even in the two articles of impeachment 
that took the most direct aim at the President’s rhetoric and conduct beyond just 
the Tenure of Office Act. Despite its omissions, Congress did identify 
presidential speech that could be broadly understood as constituting 
incitement—in particular its reference to Johnson’s “loud threats and bitter 
menaces”—in the tenth impeachment article.283  
Both the tenth article of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, and the 
general purposes of impeachment, suggest that presidential rhetoric that shades 
into incitement may be an appropriate subject of impeachment. Under the 
general understanding of impeachment outlined in Part I, “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” must both be committed by “public men”284—that is, 
individuals holding some public office—and must “strike at the fabric of the 
political order.”285 The invitation or encouragement of violence, in particular 
political violence, would seem to fit squarely within those specifications: 
threatening to the political order, fundamentally different when emanating from 
a public figure than from a private individual, and consistent with the type of 
demagoguery discussed in the preceding section. And it is here that the public 
nature of today’s presidency may be most relevant, and most dangerous: a 
president who engages in incitement or encouragement of political violence has 
 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169–70 (2000). Still, since none of the impeachment episodes discussed above grappled 
explicitly with incitement, it is useful to at least consider judge-made law here.  
 280 The Supreme Court’s most famous articulation of this standard appears in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, in which the Court explained that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. 
These include . . . insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”). 
 281 WINEAPPLE, supra note 55, at 156.  
 282 Id. at 116. 
 283 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Supp. 1868). 
 284 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 285 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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a uniquely powerful platform from which to do so. Even in 1866 and 1867, 
Johnson’s utterances were amplified through the press and reached many ears. 
Today’s presidents can, of course, reach far larger audiences.  
E. “Anticonstitutional” Statements and Conduct 
A Congress contemplating impeachment might also consider statements, 
particularly if made repeatedly, that are in some sense antithetical to 
constitutional values, or “anticonstitutional,” to use Charles Black’s term.286 To 
be sure, impeachment precedent is thinnest when it comes to this category of 
presidential rhetoric. Still, this is one possible way to frame the real reasons 
Congress moved to impeach Andrew Johnson—that through both words and 
deeds he had allied himself with the Southern states that had waged war to retain 
slavery, and that he spoke and acted in ways designed to undermine both the 
Constitution’s (then-nascent) equality principles, and members of Congress, a 
co-equal branch of government, in violation of core separation-of-powers 
principles.287 All of that seems clearly to have been, if not unconstitutional, at 
least anticonstitutional, and arguably to have formed the real basis of the 
impeachment effort.288 On this view, there is some historical support for the 
position that a sustained enough set of anticonstitutional rhetorical moves by the 
president should be considered in the context of impeachment.  
Impeachment precedent aside, there is substantial recent scholarly support 
for taking this possibility seriously. Although the term “anticonstitutional” does 
not appear frequently in the literature, scholars have argued that both Article II 
and settled constitutional practices impose certain substantive obligations on the 
president. Daphna Renan characterizes these obligations as “structural norms,” 
which she argues are “constitutive of a constitutional ‘ethos’ that touches but 
does not begin or end” with either Article II or judicial precedent.289 These 
norms include investigatory independence, limits on self-dealing and the role of 
 
 286 BLACK, supra note 11, at 31 (“I cannot believe that it would make any difference whether this conduct 
was criminal for general purposes; it would clearly be a gross and anticonstitutional abuse of power, going to 
the life of our national unity, and it would be absurd to think that a president might not properly be removed for 
it.”).  
 287 Cf. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2268 (2018) (arguing 
that notwithstanding the early (and then-controversial) examples of the Alien & Sedition Acts, presidential 
acceptance of “the legitimacy of a political opposition has since become widely recognized as a core component 
of a working constitutional government”). 
 288 Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. 
L.J. 177, 182 (2018) (“[T]o violate a constitutional convention is to engage in behavior that is anticonstitutional, 
as opposed to unconstitutional.”). 
 289 Renan, supra note 287, at 2193. 
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politics, and fact-based deliberative decision-making.290 Andrew Kent, Ethan 
Leib, and Jed Shugerman argue in a similar vein that the Take Care Clause 
imposes a direct set of requirements on the president, among them requirements 
that the president act within the scope of the office, avoid using the office for 
personal gain, and engage in “diligent, careful, good faith, and impartial 
execution of law.”291 And Corey Brettschneider argues that both the Oath Clause 
and the Take Care Clause impose on presidents an affirmative duty to support 
principles like equality, religious freedom, and respect for individual rights 
generally.292 
Although none of these works is focused on impeachment, they provide 
some potential guidance regarding the types of presidential words or actions that 
might be deemed anticonstitutional. And, if these obligations genuinely bind the 
president, it is difficult to imagine any judicial enforcement mechanism.293 
Perhaps, then, as Charles Black writes, “We ought to understand, as most 
senators and congressmen understand, that Congress’s responsibility to preserve 
the forms and the precepts of the Constitution is greater, rather than less, when 
the judicial forum is unavailable, as it sometimes must be.”294 
F. Beyond “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” 
This discussion has remained focused, as did the three historical 
impeachments discussed above, on “high crimes and misdemeanors.” But the 
Constitution also identifies two additional bases for impeachment: treason and 
bribery.295 Although presidential impeachment history contains no direct lessons 
for these constitutional categories, it is likely the case that treason can be 
committed through speech, in addition to conduct. Passing an enemy 
information regarding military strategy, for example, could constitute speech 
rather than (or, as well as) conduct; and it would likely satisfy the constitutional 
test of “adhering to their [e]nemies, giving them [a]id and [c]omfort.”296 And 
 
 290 Id. at 2207, 2215, 2221. 
 291 Kent et al., supra note 38, at 2178. 
 292 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, THE OATH AND THE OFFICE: A GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION FOR FUTURE 
PRESIDENTS 111–71 (2018). 
 293 But see Richard Schragger, Unconstitutional Government Speech 4, 6–7, (Univ. Va. Sch. L., Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2019–56, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3468469 (arguing that courts already do recognize, albeit in underdeveloped and 
undertheorized ways, certain sorts of expressive wrongs by government actors).  
 294 BLACK, supra note 11, at 22–23; see also David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 
124 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2014).  
 295 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 296 U.S. CONST. art III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against 
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”). The federal treason statute, 18 U.S.C. 
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even public-facing speech could potentially qualify; providing an enemy with 
information about war plans in full public view could, in theory, constitute 
treason under the Constitution.297 Indeed, the Constitution contemplates some 
treason happening in something like public view, limiting the possibility of 
conviction for treason this way: “No [p]erson shall be convicted of Treason 
unless on the [t]estimony of two [w]itnesses to the same overt [a]ct, or on 
[c]onfession in open [c]ourt.”298 It is possible that because the Constitution uses 
the word “Act” something more than speech is required to qualify as treason;299 
but, on the other hand, the “conviction” for which this high evidentiary burden 
is imposed is distinct from impeachment, the punishment for which extends only 
to removal from office and potential disqualification from future 
officeholding.300 
Bribery, too, could in theory be accomplished in part through public speech; 
and, unlike treason, there have been impeachments (though not of presidents) 
that actually involved bribery allegations.301 Although most transactions 
involving bribery are conducted in secret, it is certainly possible that a president 
could offer or solicit a bribe in public view; if that were to occur, a bribery-based 
impeachment, one that relied heavily on public statements, might well be 
appropriate.  
 
§ 2381, slightly expands on the constitutional standard and provides for penalties that include death.  
 297 The country’s very first impeachment, of Senator William Blount—often viewed as establishing the 
precedent that members of Congress cannot be impeached—was predicated upon Blount’s involvement in a 
conspiracy to assist British officials with a plan to take possession of certain U.S. territories. David Currie, The 
First Impeachment: The Constitution’s Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
427, 427–28 (1998) (book review). Although Blount was expelled by the Senate rather than impeached, id. at 
427, the fact pattern is one that, in the case of an enemy in the constitutional sense, and an officer subject to 
impeachment, could lead to a treason-based impeachment. And, in 1862, Judge West Humphreys was impeached 
and removed from office after he declared his support for secession and the Confederacy; the impeachment 
documents, however, listed high crimes and misdemeanors, not treason, as the basis for the impeachment. See 
Impeachment of West H. Humphreys, Judge of the United States District Court of Tennessee, H.R. REP. NO. 37-
44, at 1–2 (1862).  
 298 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.  
 299 But see Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427, 430 
(2015) (raising questions about the viability of the speech/conduct distinction). 
 300 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States.”).  
 301 Several federal judges, including Alcee Hastings, G. Thomas Porteous, and Robert Archbald have been 
impeached for conduct involving bribery. See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, 
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/ 
Impeachment-List/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).  
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G. Constitutional Shields 
When the president’s words have figured in impeachment inquiries, 
Congress has been presented with First Amendment defenses. Even as early as 
the 1868 trial of Andrew Johnson, when understandings of the First 
Amendment’s reach and meaning were far more circumscribed than they are 
today,302 Johnson’s counsel suggested (though did not develop the argument in 
written submissions) that the charge in article ten “relat[ed] to freedom of speech 
or its exercise by the citizens of the United States, or by this respondent as one 
of the said citizens or otherwise;” as to article eleven, the response repeated that 
“[t]he President denies specifically the charges, standing upon his right to 
freedom of speech as set forth in the answer to the preceding article.”303 Defense 
attorney Ben Curtis’s opening statement during the Senate trial further 
developed this point: “[T]his prohibition in the Constitution against any 
legislation by Congress in restraint of the freedom of speech is necessarily an 
absolute prohibition . . . . What is the law to be? . . . The only rule I have 
heard, . . . is that you may require the speaker to speak properly.” He continued: 
“Who are to be the judges whether he speaks properly? In this case the Senate 
of the United States, on the presentation of the House of Representatives of the 
United States; and that is supposed to be the freedom of speech secured by this 
absolute prohibition of the Constitution.”304 Here Curtis seemed to suggest that 
article ten identified nothing more serious than breaches of protocol or decorum, 
and that the very inclusion of presidential statements in the article was 
inconsistent with the guarantees of the First Amendment.  
President Nixon’s attorneys referenced Johnson’s answers in their written 
filings before the House Judiciary Committee, although they failed to develop 
any First Amendment argument305—and of course, President Nixon’s 
resignation foreclosed any real debate on these questions. Still, some 
commentators did engage with the issue at the time. In 1975, Raoul Berger took 
sharp issue with even the suggestion that the First Amendment could be invoked 
in the way Nixon’s attorneys were gesturing toward: “[T]he Bill of Rights was 
designed to secure protection to the people against the government, not to 
 
 302 See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 917, 917 (2017) (“Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of the First Amendment.”). 
 303 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 
884–85 (1907).  
 304 1 BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. WITH SOME OF HIS 
PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 412 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879). 
 305 ST. CLAIR MEMO, supra note 153, at 56 (“President Johnson . . . noted that the charges in Articles ten 
and eleven were protected by the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
SHAWPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 11:50 AM 
2020] IMPEACHABLE SPEECH 53 
insulate government officers from accountability . . . . For example, 
the . . . [F]irst [A]mendment is concerned with ‘the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble,’ not of officers of government against whom protection was thus 
guaranteed.”306 This Nixon-era exchange could presage future debates about 
both the scope and the substantive protection of the First Amendment when it 
comes to presidential speech.307  
Outside of the impeachment context, there are of course First Amendment 
cases that grapple with government officials as speakers. The Pickering/Garcetti 
line of cases attends to the speech rights of government employees, creating a 
standard that is understood to grant public employees very limited First 
Amendment rights when they speak pursuant to their official duties.308 But it is 
not clear whether or how the reasoning in these cases would have any application 
to the unique figure of the president, who is clearly not a government 
“employee” in the same sense as the officials at issue in the Court’s cases, and 
where the “sanction” of impeachment is surely distinct from other sorts of 
professional consequences public employees might face over the content of their 
speech.309  
Other precedent could support the argument that a president’s speech is in 
some sense protected from sanction by the First Amendment. Perhaps most 
relevant here is Bond v. Floyd, in which the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment prevented the Georgia legislature from refusing to seat Julian Bond, 
based on speeches he had made criticizing the Vietnam War and the federal 
government generally.310 A president might invoke this case to support the 
argument that a Congress pursuing impeachment based in part on speech is 
 
 306 Raoul Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865, 871 (1975). 
 307 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (2004) (“Questions about the boundaries of the First 
Amendment are not questions of strength—the degree of protection that the First Amendment offers—but rather 
are questions of scope—whether the First Amendment applies at all.”). 
 308 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We 
hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”); see Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. 
REV. 301 (2015). 
 309 I am putting to one side a line of cases holding that when government is acting as speaker, including 
when it advances particular policy positions, the First Amendment grants it more leeway than when it is 
regulating private speech; as the Court has held, the First Amendment does not “require government to 
maintain . . . neutrality when its officers and employees speak” about governmental endeavors. Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 206–07 
(2015); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 989 (2004) 
(considering government participation in public debate). 
 310 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966). 
SHAWPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 11:50 AM 
54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
engaging in a form of impermissible viewpoint discrimination. And government 
officials have of course asserted violations of First Amendment interests in other 
arenas; in McConnell v. FEC, for example, Senator Mitch McConnell brought a 
court challenge to much of the newly enacted Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA).311 Still, as with the government speech cases discussed above, it is not 
at all clear how these cases might be implicated in a dispute involving the 
president, let alone an impeachment case. 
Although none of this has been tested in the impeachment context, there have 
been some recent suggestions that the invocation of presidential speech in 
litigation might raise First Amendment concerns. Judge Kozinski made this 
claim in an opinion regarding one of the challenges to President Trump’s first 
“travel ban” executive order.312 Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, 
Judge Kozinski criticized the panel for citing “a trove of informal and unofficial 
statements from the President and his advisers.”313 This approach, Kozinski 
warned, threatened to “chill campaign speech, despite the fact that our most 
basic free speech principles have their ‘fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’”314 Given the near-
constant campaigning in which an incumbent president might engage, this 
argument could be extended to virtually every statement a president makes—
including in the context of an impeachment inquiry.315 
Presidential lies and misstatements may also intersect with First Amendment 
arguments in the context of impeachment. In recent years, the Supreme Court 
has announced something approaching a First Amendment right to lie,316 at least 
under some circumstances, and lower courts have struck down a number of state 
statutes prohibiting lies or false statements.317 It is not difficult to imagine 
 
 311 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The McConnell Court 
did not question the ability of McConnell and other plaintiffs to maintain their First Amendment challenge to 
the core provisions of BCRA—and where it did find challengers lacked the ability to challenge certain ancillary 
provisions of BCRA, it did so based on the remoteness of the harm. Id. at 226 (“Because Senator McConnell’s 
current term does not expire until 2009, the earliest day he could be affected by § 305 is 45 days before the 
Republican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III 
standing.”). 
 312 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. (citing McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191–192 (2014)). 
 315 Jenna Johnson, ‘Life is a Campaign’: After a Difficult First Month, Trump Returns to His Comfort 
Zone, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017, 10:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/ 
02/18/after-one-month-in-the-white-house-trump-returns-to-the-campaign-trail-for-a-dose-of-adoration/. 
 316 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715, 729–30 (2012); see also Leslie Kendrick, How Much Does 
Speech Matter?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (2016). 
 317 See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2016) (striking down Ohio’s 
“political false-statements” law); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 795 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding law 
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government officials, including potentially presidents, invoking these cases as a 
defense against an impeachment article based on lies and misstatements.  
Still, there are strong responses to these arguments. First, as a general matter, 
the Constitution’s conspicuous failure to protect presidential speech in the way 
it protects legislative speech may be significant. The Speech or Debate Clause 
provides that “for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”318 The provision 
has been understood to grant legislative-branch officials immunity from criminal 
and civil penalties for actions and statements within the sphere of legislative 
activity.319 Although this kind of legislative immunity is far from absolute,320 it 
is nevertheless significant that the Constitution singles out legislative speech for 
protection—and that no analogous privilege or protection has ever been 
understood to extend to the statements of the president.  
Moreover, the president’s access to the bully pulpit would seem to supply a 
compelling argument against allowing the president to utilize the First 
Amendment as a shield, in impeachment proceedings or otherwise. On virtually 
any theory of the First Amendment, its core purposes are to protect individual 
speech and expression from governmental interference;321 it would accordingly 
 
prohibiting false statements in conjunction with ballot initiatives neither “narrowly tailored [n]or necessary to 
preserve fair and honest elections and prevent a fraud on the electorate”); cf. Martin H. Redish & Kyle Voils, 
False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency 
Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 768 (2017) (“[T]o the extent false noncommercial speech is 
deemed to have value, if only indirectly, false commercial speech should be seen as serving the very same 
values.”). 
 318 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 319 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 312–13 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 
502–03 (1969); see also Michael L. Shenkman, Talking About Speech or Debate: Revisiting Legislative 
Immunity, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 371–84 (2014) (explaining the immunity that the provision is 
understood to provide). 
 320 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130–32 (1979) (permitting lawsuit against Senator based 
on materials he distributed outside of the legislature, on the grounds that “neither the newsletters nor the press 
release was ‘essential to the deliberations of the Senate’ and neither was part of the deliberative process”); Gravel 
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625–26 (1972) (concluding that Senator Gravel’s activities surrounding 
publication of the Pentagon Papers were “not part and parcel of the legislative process” and thus not covered by 
the Speech or Debate Clause); JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 229 (2017) (critiquing the Court’s unduly narrow vision of the clause, and arguing: 
“real legislative authority is, in fact, largely constructed through the processes of public engagement, and the 
Speech or Debate Clause ought to be understood to facilitate those processes”); see also JOSH CHAFETZ, 
DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 106 (2007) (noting that the purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is “to preserve 
legislative independence, not supremacy” (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508)). 
 321 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591–94 (1982); David A. 
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334–35 (1991); Genevieve 
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be perverse to allow the amendment’s use to further augment the powers of the 
president, who already has access to the most powerful speech platform in the 
country.322 
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP AND IMPEACHABLE SPEECH 
This brief final Part does not attempt to comprehensively assess the degree 
to which President Trump’s rhetoric should have figured in the impeachment 
proceedings that concluded with his February 2020 Senate acquittal. Those 
proceedings for the most part did not involve public presidential speech, 
focusing instead on the President’s decision to withhold military assistance and 
other official government acts from Ukraine in order to induce that country to 
announce political investigations into the President’s political rivals.323 The two 
impeachment articles that grew out of the House’s investigation into those 
events charged President Trump with abuse of power and obstruction of 
Congress.324 Nothing in the articles themselves discussed public speech, 
although the lengthy committee report that accompanied them did;325 public 
presidential speech was also invoked a number of times in the House and Senate, 
though again it did not play a central role.326  
Instead of a detailed post-mortem of the Trump impeachment,327 this Part 
suggests a few of the ways the history and analysis offered here might prove 
relevant to the public and Congress in 2020 and beyond, both as perspective on 
the recently-concluded impeachment proceedings, and for purposes of potential 
future impeachment efforts. 
 
Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2120 (2018). 
 322 Any move to cloak the President’s speech in the protections of the First Amendment might suggest 
parallels to developments in First Amendment doctrine in the Roberts Court, which has on some accounts 
transformed First Amendment freedoms from “weapons of the weak into one more resource that wealthy 
interests could deploy to preserve their advantages.” Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an 
Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–60 (2018); see also Burt Neuborne, Taking 
Hearers Seriously, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1426–29 (2013) (describing the First Amendment’s shifting 
ideological valence). 
 323 Phillip Bump, Assessing a Key Impeachment Argument: Trump’s Desired Investigations Were Only 
for His Own Benefit, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/23/ 
assessing-key-impeachment-argument-trumps-desired-investigations-were-only-his-own-benefit/. 
 324 H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. § 1, 2 (2019). 
 325 HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT 
148–49 (2019) [hereinafter TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT REPORT]. 
 326 See SPECIAL COUNS. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 1 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 19 n.36 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT]. 
 327 There will surely be plenty of these to come (and some already in print). See, e.g., NEAL KATYAL & 
SAM KOPPELMAN, IMPEACH: THE CASE AGAINST DONALD TRUMP 10–14 (2019). 
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A. Lies & Misstatements 
First, the history suggests that the fact that the President has lied, even lied 
repeatedly, is likely not in itself sufficient to warrant impeachment: what matters 
is what kinds of lies the President tells, and whether and how they relate to a 
broader pattern of abuse of office, or of public trust. Frank Bowman takes the 
position that although it may not be politically advisable to pursue impeachment 
based purely or primarily on presidential lies, after a point, “chronic lying may 
be a political offense in the Hamiltonian sense insofar as it cripples the liar in 
the performance of his presidential duties.”328 He elaborates: “[C]hronic 
presidential lies do not merely render the president himself ineffectual, but also 
damage every other branch and function of American government . . . pervasive 
lying by a president tends to undermine the entire constitutional order.”329 
Bowman’s argument is intriguing; and, although it lacks substantial support 
in impeachment history, it is also the case that President Trump’s propensity to 
lie distinguishes him from previous presidents.330 But it does seem clear that not 
all presidential lies are equally relevant or equally consequential; rather, the 
history suggests that particular types of presidential lies, where those lies are 
connected to acts that are themselves subversive of the political order, might 
figure in an impeachment charge. So, in the case of President Trump (or a future 
president whose rhetoric resembles that of President Trump), lies that are tied to 
concealing the pursuit of election assistance from a foreign country, or to 
concealing the commingling of personal business activities with official 
presidential duties and functions, might serve as a component of an 
impeachment proceeding or charge that also encompasses the election 
interference, improper business activities, or other underlying conduct that itself 
may constitute “high crimes and misdemeanors.”  
B. Incitement 
The history also suggests that presidential speech might be analogized to 
incitement in the impeachment context. In the case of President Trump, there are 
at least two contenders for an inquiry into something like incitement. The first, 
which may fall somewhere between incitement and solicitation, involves 
 
 328 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 274. 
 329 Id. 
 330 See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Ian Prasad Philbrick & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies vs. Obama’s, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opinion/sunday/trump-lies-
obama-who-is-worse.html; Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo & Meg Kelly, President Trump Has Made 12,019 
False or Misleading Claims over 928 Days, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2019/08/12/president-trump-has-made-false-or-misleading-claims-over-days/. 
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invitations to foreign actors and foreign governments to interfere in U.S. 
elections. There are a number of such examples of conduct already in the public 
domain. One involves then-candidate Trump’s public request that Russia pursue 
emails from Hillary Clinton’s private email server during the 2016 election. In 
July of 2016, the day after Wikileaks’s first release of documents stolen from 
the DNC and Clinton campaign chair John Podesta, then-candidate Trump said 
during a press conference: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you find the 
30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily 
by our press.”331 According to the Mueller Report, within five hours of that press 
conference, “a Russian intelligence service began targeting email addresses 
associated with Hillary Clinton for possible hacks.”332 Although President 
Trump’s written answers to questions from Mueller’s office maintained that this 
comment had been made “in jest and sarcastically,”333 Congress could certainly 
conclude that the sequence of events detailed in the Mueller Report at least 
warranted consideration for impeachment. And at the time of this writing, 
President Trump has made several similar public requests in connection to the 
2020 election. On one occasion he essentially invited China to investigate Joe 
Biden;334 on several others, he publicly echoed his private requests to Ukraine 
to investigate both Biden and the 2016 elections.335 And in fact, these events 
were invoked by the House impeachment managers.336 But those things 
remained at the periphery of the theory of impeachment, seeming to serve more 
as atmospherics than a core component of the impeachment case. 
The second type of speech in this category is one several commentators have 
alluded to, although not always in the context of impeachment: incitement of 
violence, both against the President’s critics and toward members of particular 
groups. A number of presidential statements (whether delivered in person or via 
Twitter) could prove relevant here. To choose just a few examples involving 
 
 331 David A. Graham, Trump’s Plea for Russia to Hack the U.S. Government, ATLANTIC (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-pleas-for-russia-to-hack-classified-american-
information/493244/; Erica R. Hendry, Trump Asked Russia to Find Clinton’s Emails. On or Around the Same 
Day, Russians Targeted Her Accounts, PBS (July 13, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-
asked-russia-to-find-clintons-emails-on-or-around-the-same-day-russians-targeted-her-accounts. 
 332 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 326. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Phillip Rucker, Rachael Bade & Colby Itkowitz, Trump Publicly Calls on China to Investigate Bidens, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-publicly-calls-on-china-to-
investigate-bidens/2019/10/03/2ae94f6a-e5f2-11e9-b403-f738899982d2_story.html. 
 335 TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 325. 
 336 See Noah Weiland, Impeachment Briefing, N.Y. Times (Jan.22, 2020), https://messaging-custom-
newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?uri=nyt://newsletter/a576ceaa-9dcf-4e10-8653-57878b4619b7&te= 
1&nl=impeachment-briefing&emc=edit_ib_20200226 (describing House Managers playing video clips of 
President Trump “publicly calling on Ukraine and China to investigate Joe Biden”).  
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President Trump, the President has tweeted images of violence against 
representations of those in the media he perceives as his adversaries, like 
CNN;337 refused to condemn white supremacist violence that resulted in a 
nonviolent protestor’s death in 2017 in Charlottesville, Virginia, instead 
insisting that both sides included “very fine people”;338 and tweeted, in response 
to protests over the police killing of George Floyd, that “when the looting starts, 
the shooting starts.”339 
In the wake of a 2019 mass shooting in El Paso, Texas, by an avowed white 
supremacist whose manifesto mirrored much of President Trump’s anti-
immigrant rhetoric,340 a number of commentators made the explicit tie to 
incitement. Conservative columnist Bret Stephens wrote that “[t]he right’s 
attempt to downplay the specifically ideological context of the El Paso massacre 
is a transparently self-serving effort to absolve the president of moral 
responsibility for his demagogic rhetoric . . . . The president is guilty, in a broad 
sense, of a form of incitement.”341 And a former national leader of the anti-
abortion movement—who on his own account is no stranger to political 
violence—cautioned, “If Mr. Trump doesn’t stop spewing derision, then 
angry and tortured souls like the mass murderer in El Paso will continue 
to take him seriously.”342  
C. “Anticonstitutional” Speech & Demagoguery 
Finally, let us return to a set of actual articles of impeachment introduced in 
the House Judiciary Committee in December 2017. Those articles accused 
President Trump of speech and actions that likely fall short of actual incitement, 
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but that are nevertheless antithetical to constitutional principles like equality, 
religious freedom, and a free press. Those articles alleged that Trump had 
associated the presidency “with causes rooted in white supremacy, bigotry, 
racism, anti-Semitism, white nationalism [and] neo-Nazism,” and accused him 
of “sowing discord among the people of the United States, on the basis of race, 
national origin, religion, gender, and sexual orientation.”343 
Those articles were voted down by the House in July 2019, the very month 
of the phone call between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky at 
the heart of the Ukraine impeachment saga.344 And they represented a very 
different theory of presidential misconduct from the one that grounded President 
Trump’s actual impeachment. The 2017 articles grappled much more directly 
with the truly unprecedented character of President Trump’s speech: President 
Trump’s propensity to use the bully pulpit to insult, to scapegoat, to self-
aggrandize, to spread falsehoods and misinformation—in short, to 
demagogue.345 As Jeffrey Tulis wrote just a few months into President Trump’s 
Administration, “If President Trump exercises the office in the same demagogic 
manner that he campaigned, he might actualize the Founder’s nightmare 
scenario: a corrosive leader posing an existential threat to the constitutional 
order.”346 
Clearly, President Trump’s use of rhetoric has not changed dramatically 
during his first three years in office.347 A recent New York Times analysis 
examined the President’s 11,000 tweets between January 20, 2017, and 
November 1, 2019, and found that “more than half of the president’s posts—
5,889—have been attacks; no other category even comes close.”348 Targets of 
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criticism or attack have included political opponents, journalists, current and 
former executive-branch officials, members of Congress, private individuals,349 
and federal judges.350 Even prominent members of the President’s own party 
concede that “we have never had a president so . . . brazen in his abusive attacks 
on the courts, the press, Congress (including members of his own party), and 
even senior officials within his own administration.”351 In the immediate run-up 
to the 2020 election, President Trump has focused his attacks on voting by mail; 
he has even floated the idea of delaying the election.352 Again, some of the 
President’s rhetoric in this vein appeared in the President’s impeachment 
proceedings.353 But the President’s rhetoric as such was not on trial. 
As Bob Bauer writes, “The challenge is to identify with reasonable precision 
when a leader has departed from the accepted, rough-and-tumble political 
rhetoric—from the standard license afforded to a politicians’ speeches and 
utterances—and has become a demagogue.”354 Even if it were possible to 
identify some such line, it is not entirely clear that demagoguery alone warrants 
impeachment under the precedents of the last 230 years. But the history detailed 
above suggests that the mere fact that demagoguery is speech does not require 
us to deem it off-limits in debates about impeachment. This may be particularly 
true if the presidential rhetoric in question can be tied to particular sorts of 
presidential misconduct or abuse of office. 
Indeed, one of the key lessons of the Johnson saga may be that it is better for 
the Congress to be forthright about its view of presidential failings, including 
those that are primarily rhetorical—although it is also important to avoid a slide 
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into treating maladministration as impeachable. In Johnson’s case, rather than 
take explicit aim at Johnson’s sabotage of the Reconstruction project, racist and 
anticonstitutional rhetoric and conduct, and general unfitness for the presidency, 
congressional opponents primarily pointed to Johnson’s removal of Stanton. 
There may be a lesson here regarding the wisdom of focusing on these sorts of 
discrete acts, rather than broader patterns of conduct as well as rhetoric, when 
making the case for impeachment.  
CONCLUSION 
Benjamin Franklin is often credited with making the case at the 
Constitutional Convention that impeachment offered, in the words of Laurence 
Tribe and Joshua Matz, “a civilized answer to problems once solved by assassins 
and revolutionaries.”355 The Constitution, then, did contemplate a president who 
became so intolerable that election was not a sufficient check on his power. But 
the precise point at which impeachment would be warranted was left open in the 
document, and intervening Congresses have struggled to answer that question 
with reference to the presidential conduct and background conditions of the time.  
The rise over the last century of the “rhetorical presidency,”356 in which 
presidents are expected to take their messages directly to the American people—
a trend that has accelerated dramatically in the age of Trump—may mean 
thinking in new ways about the relationship between speech and impeachment. 
On the one hand, the emergence of the rhetorical presidency may counsel 
hesitation before invoking impeachment for something that has become a core 
feature of presidential governance; on the other hand, the full blossoming of the 
rhetorical presidency in the digital age means that presidents have access to a 
powerful tool of self-help in impeachment.357 The very power and reach of the 
presidential platform also amplifies the potential dangers that can flow from a 
lawless president’s speech—and may require us to think in new ways about the 
checking mechanism of impeachment.  
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